RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

 Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom From:

a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life

The security forces continued to employ harsh measures against rebels and civilians in separatist zones where most politically motivated extrajudicial killings occurred. The security forces also committed numerous extrajudicial killings that were not politically motivated. The Government largely failed to hold soldiers and police accountable for such killings and other serious human rights abuses.

In Aceh, where separatist GAM rebels remained active, military and police personnel committed many extrajudicial killings and used excessive force against non-combatants as well as combatants; at least 898 persons were killed during the year. This figure included civilians, rebels, and security force members, with civilians accounting for most of the fatalities. However, security forces and rebels gave conflicting information on victims' identities, making it difficult to determine the breakdown of civilian, rebel, and security force deaths. Many of the killings appeared to be executions. The Government and the GAM accused each other of killing captured combatants, and there was evidence to support such claims. Press reports undercounted the number of casualties, and some deaths never appeared in the newspapers. Police rarely investigated extrajudicial killings and almost never publicized such investigations.

On June 7, on Kayee Ciret Mountain in Aceh, TNI soldiers shot and killed two farmers and wounded five others in a raid on a hut in an area suspected as a hideout for GAM rebels. The attack occurred at dawn, while the farmers slept. On August 3, in the north Aceh village of Kandang, six gunmen stormed into a number of houses and shot and killed three local women. The GAM accused the Brimob of carrying out the attack because relatives of the victims had links to the GAM. The security forces rejected this allegation, but the NGO Central Information for Aceh Referendum (SIRA) reported that a group of Brimob visited the village on the night in question. Village witnesses identified the gunmen as police and recognized the group's leader, Syarifuddin, a sergeant feared for his alleged brutality. On December 1, in Banda Aceh, a group of unidentified men kidnaped a 26-year-old human rights activist of the Coalition for West Aceh Students Movement (Kagempar). Three days later, villagers found his mutilated body face-down in the water underneath a bridge. Reliable sources said the young man's skull had been penetrated repeatedly with a screwdriver.

Police in Aceh did not announce the results of any investigations into extrajudicial killings carried out by the security forces in previous years. In addition, the Government released soldiers suspected of involvement in the December 2000 slaying of three NGO workers in North Aceh because the suspects already had served the maximum period of detention before trial. During the year, credible sources in North Aceh spotted civilian suspects in the same case who had disappeared from police custody in 2001.

Numerous killings that occurred in Aceh during the year could not be clearly attributed to either the security forces or the GAM rebels. For instance, on March 16, unidentified assailants shot and killed six persons in the town of Lombaro Angan, Aceh Besar district, after 30 police were ambushed while searching for GAM rebels. Local residents said the victims all were politically inactive farmers who were killed while working in a rice field. GAM spokesman Ayah Sofyan later indicated that one of the six persons killed was a GAM member. On September 4, in the village of Gumpueng Tiro, Pidie regency, unidentified persons stopped a public minivan, abducted two high school girls, took them to a nearby forest, and fatally shot them. According to the local press, unidentified gunmen also shot and killed 14 teachers during the year; it was unclear who was responsible for killing schoolteachers in the province.

Investigation continued into the August 2001 massacre of 31 persons at a palm oil plantation run by PT Bumi Flora in Idi Rayeuk, East Aceh. The National Commission on Human Rights (KOMNASHAM) formed an investigation team (KPP HAM), whose members visited the site in July. The team examined evidence, spoke with local residents and met with officials. However, the team did not announce the results of the investigation. Human Rights Watch (HRW) released a report containing the text of interviews with witnesses to the slaughter and noted that "all of the witnesses believed that the Indonesian Army was responsible for the killings."

During the year, GAM members killed many police, soldiers, civil servants, politicians, and other Aceh residents. Although many Acehnese feared and resented the security forces because of their involvement in human rights abuses, local support for the GAM declined during the year, according to neutral Aceh-based observers. The GAM alienated large segments of Acehnese society through a campaign of extortion and kidnaping for profit. On January 31, in Lhokseumawe, suspected GAM members shot and killed Dr. Murdan, as he headed to work at a hospital in the community of Cut Meutia. The killing had a ripple effect, as it discouraged paramedics from providing services to that area. On March 6, at a coffee plantation in the central Aceh town of Linge, GAM rebels apprehended, questioned, and killed Sarifuji, an ethnic Javanese. The GAM subsequently claimed responsibility. The GAM acknowledged that on April 9, its forces shot and killed two soldiers as they traveled by motorbike near the north Aceh town of Kuala Meuraksa. The soldiers' two rifles were captured in the raid, which the GAM acknowledged carrying out. During the year, police made progress in investigating some killings allegedly committed by the GAM. However, the overall amount of progress disappointed NGOs and legal experts. GAM leaders accused the security forces of executing captured rebels, without benefit of a trial. On June 26, Aceh's police chief announced the arrest of seven men, including GAM rebel Tengku Don, in connection with the killings of prominent Acehnese. The police accused Tengku Don of involvement in the September 6, 2001 killing of Dayan Dawood, rector of Banda Aceh's Syiah Kuala University, who was shot after offering to mediate between the GAM and the Government. Tengku Don allegedly possessed one of the pistols used in the killing, and there were indications that the attack was criminally motivated. In August a court convicted five GAM separatists of carrying out an arson attack in Takengon, Central Aceh. The lead conspirator received a 16-year term, while the others, who did not take part in setting the blaze, were sentenced to 10 months in jail. Police did not publicize any other investigations into killings allegedly committed by the rebels in Aceh.

The Government did not announce the results of its investigation into the 2001 killings of Aceh provincial legislator Zaini Sulaiman and prominent politician Teungku Johan. The Government also did not announce any results from its alleged investigations into the deaths of Sukardi, Sulaiman Ahmad, Jafar Siddiq Hamzah, Tengku Safwan Idris, or NGO activist Nashiruddin Daud, all killed in 2000.

In Papua, where separatist sentiment remained strong and a low-intensity conflict continued between the TNI and armed rebels of the Free Papua Movement (OPM), there were no verified cases of politically motivated killings by the security forces during the year; however, many such killings were alleged. There also were deaths that many indigenous Papuans found suspicious. On January 22, in Bonggo, Papua, Kopassus troops shot and killed  Leisina Yaneiba, a clerk at a logging company. She had intervened in an altercation between Kopassus guards and a former employee, Martinus Maware, whom the TNI alleged was an OPM rebel (see Section 1.b.). On June 21, in the Papuan city of Wamena, Dani tribal chief Yafet Yelemaken died following a trip to Bali, where he had met a police acquaintance; friends concluded that the policeman poisoned Yelemaken during a visit to his hotel room. Despite widespread media coverage, no physical or factual evidence supported this theory. In August on the Papuan island of Biak, NGOs, religious groups, and Adat (traditional) councils accused the military of killing at least three Papuans. Hospital records indicated, however, that two of the persons in question drowned at sea and the third died in a road accident. On August 31, unidentified assailants killed three persons, including two foreigners, and wounded 12 others in an attack close to a large gold and copper mine near Timika, in Papua. The victims were teachers on a recreational outing. Several people dressed in military fatigues reportedly stopped the teachers' convoy in a heavy fog on the Tembagapura-Timika road and fired at the vehicles at close range. The Government quickly alleged that OPM had carried out the attack; the group denied responsibility. During the course of the initial police investigation, senior police officials were quoted in the press about indications that soldiers were involved in the attack. The initial police probe and subsequent military follow-up investigations were followed at year's end by a joint police-military investigation. In addition, the Government agreed to incorporate assistance from the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation.

On June 9, police arrested highland leader Benny Wenda in connection with a December 2000 attack in the northeastern Papuan community of Abepura, which resulted in the deaths of two police officers and one security guard. On October 26, Wenda escaped from prison and was on the run at year's end.

The Government made progress in its investigation into the November 2001 killing of Papuan pro-independence leader Theys Hiyo Eluay, who was found dead in his car outside the provincial capital, Jayapura. Based on a February 5 presidential decree, the Government set up a National Investigation Committee (KPN) made up of Government and civil society members to probe the killing. The team traveled to Papua on February 25, and on March 19, the military announced that soldiers had been declared suspects in the case. The KPN delivered its findings to President Megawati on April 29, classifying the killing as an ordinary crime, not a gross human rights violation. The two Papuan KPN members and other Papuan groups rejected this finding, and urged KOMNASHAM to investigate it as a state crime. The Government initially detained nine Kopassus members in connection with the killing and investigated three additional suspects. At year's end, seven soldiers remained suspects, but none of them had been tried.

Other government investigations in Papua made little progress. Police made no perceptible headway in their probe of the 2001 disappearances and suspected killings of Willem Onde, leader of the Papua Liberation Front Army (TPNP), and his friend, Johanes Tumeng. Bodies believed to be theirs and bearing evidence of gunshot wounds were found floating in the Kumundu River with their hands bound. The Government did not report any progress in its investigation into the alleged police killings in 2001 of 12 civilians in the northwest Papua city of Wasior. NGOs claimed the Brimob carried out the killings in revenge of a June 2001 attack on a police post that left 5 police officers dead. Unknown persons returned three of the six weapons seized during that attack following negotiations between police and community leaders. Negotiations for the return of the remaining weapons continued at year's end. In a related case, the Government announced no progress in its probe into the earlier alleged police killings of six Papuan civilians in Waisor in May 2001. The six were apparently returning home from a celebration when they were killed.

In the western Java Province of Banten, on March 23, seven members of the Presidential Guard reportedly kidnaped and then killed Endang Hidayat, village chief of Binuangeun, in Lebak regency. Evidence suggested that the guardsmen killed Endang because he had informed police that one of the guards had purchased stolen motorcycles.

Occasional clashes between the police and military resulted in civilian deaths as well as fatalities among the security forces. Chronically underfunded soldiers and police clashed periodically over control of criminal enterprises, including drugs, gambling, illegal logging, and prostitution. In September in the north Sumatran town of Binjai, an armed confrontation between soldiers and police left seven police, one soldier and three civilians dead, and at least four civilians injured. The dispute reportedly began when police arrested a soldier for selling the drug ecstasy. On October 2, Army Chief of Staff Ryamizard Ryacudu dishonorably discharged 20 soldiers who were involved in the dispute. On December 18, a military tribunal sentenced 9 of those soldiers to between 5 months and 30 months in prison.

Police and soldiers clashed 23 times during the year, a decrease of at least 35 percent from the same period a year earlier. During the year in Entiekong, West Kalimantan, a shootout between police and soldiers caused an unknown number of casualties. The clash reportedly occurred when police tried to close a TNI protected gambling operation. On August 12, in the West Java village of Cicurug, Bogor Regency, a brawl between police and soldiers left one policeman dead and three injured. The clash reportedly occurred after police tried to rescue an alleged pickpocket who was being beaten by troops.

Police frequently used deadly force to apprehend suspects. On September 25 in Makassar, South Sulawesi, police were criticized for fatally shooting Iwan, a suspected gang member, who was in their custody. Police claimed they shot him when he tried to escape; however, an autopsy showed he was shot five times at close range. The Legal Aid Society (LBH) condemned the killing. Reliable statistics on the use of deadly force by police were not available. Senior police officials said they punished officers who used excessive force, but such punishments were not made public. On December 31, the Jakarta police chief said his office fired or suspended 107 officers during the year for misconduct, but he did not identify the types of misconduct. The police did not announce the results of any probe of excessive force from previous years.

The Government followed up on widespread killings in East Timor in 1999 by holding trials under the East Timor Ad Hoc Tribunal on Human Rights; however, the Government failed to prosecute the cases effectively (see Section 1.e.).

Of the six former East Timorese militia members who were convicted of killing three UNHCR workers in December 2001 in Atambua, West Timor, two were freed on their own recognizance, according to a reliable source who spotted them during the year. The law allows for appeals of Supreme Court decisions, but the six had not filed an appeal by year's end.

On March 7, the Central Jakarta Criminal Court sentenced former East Timor militiaman Jacobus Bere to 6 years in prison for the 2000 killing of New Zealand U.N. peacekeeper Leonard Manning. Prosecutors had sought a 12-year term. The presiding judge offered no explanation for the light sentence, and the prosecution vowed to appeal but had not done so by year's end. On March 20, the court acquitted three of Bere's accomplices.

During the year, there was no progress in the high profile Semanggi and Trisakti cases. In May 1998, four students at Jakarta's Trisakti University were shot dead, and a number of police officers were implicated. Six months later, also in Jakarta, at least nine demonstrators were shot dead at the Semanggi interchange. In 2002 efforts by KOMNASHAM to move the cases forward met with tremendous resistance from the military, police, Attorney General's office, and DPR. The security forces and many lawmakers maintained that the incidents were criminal and did not constitute major human rights abuses. The Attorney General's office twice returned case dossiers to KOMNASHAM, stating they were incomplete.

In the eastern Provinces of Maluku, North Maluku, and Central Sulawesi, ongoing communal conflicts between Christians and Muslims continued, but at a much lower level than in previous years. Nevertheless, civilians and sectarian civilian militias committed scores of extrajudicial killings. The reduced death toll in those areas resulted mainly from the heavy deployment of security forces and, to a lesser extent, from government-brokered peace agreements between the two sides.

In January 1999, intense sectarian fighting erupted in Maluku and North Maluku, where the population was roughly evenly divided between Christians and Muslims. The fighting followed years of simmering political, economic and territorial tension, and, according to some observers, recent provocation by outsiders. The catalyst most often cited was a dispute between a Christian bus driver and a Muslim passenger. The dispute degenerated into a street brawl and 2 months of rioting, leaving hundreds of persons dead in the Maluku capital, Ambon. The city fragmented into a number of guarded religious enclaves patrolled by militias. The military inserted an elite force, but by 2000 and 2001, virtually no Moluccan island had been spared from the interreligious conflict. In May 2000, thousands of members of the Java-based Islamic extremist group Laskar Jihad (LJ) arrived in the Moluccas to fight alongside fellow Muslims, escalating the violence to a new level. Scholars said LJ polarized many citizens along religious lines and reversed a conflict in which the Christians previously had had the upper hand. By the end of 2001, interreligious fighting in the Moluccas had killed thousands of persons and displaced hundreds of thousands.

On February 11 and 12, the Moluccan Christian and Muslim communities reached an agreement to work for peace. A major insertion of security forces bolstered the government-brokered accord, known as Malino II. Violence subsided quickly and a fragile peace emerged, bringing some stability. On April 28, however, a gang of masked men entered the Christian Ambonese village of Soya and killed at least 12 residents. The attack came hours after LJ's commander, Ja'far Umar Thalib, delivered an incendiary speech, saying there would be no reconciliation with Christians, and that Muslims must prepare for combat. The Government arrested Thalib on May 4 and put him on trial on August 15 for inciting religious violence, insulting the Government, and humiliating the President. On December 19, prosecutors requested that judges sentence Thalib to 1 year in jail, a sentence that some human rights activists rejected as too light. The trial was ongoing at year's end. On October 15, LJ closed its headquarters, and Thalib and other LJ officials later confirmed that the group had been dissolved. Hundreds of former members subsequently left Ambon. On May 25, unidentified attackers in two speedboats opened fire on the passenger ferry Oyo Star off Haruku island and killed five Christians. At year's end, the shaky peace remained in place, but violence in the Moluccas had killed approximately 75 persons and prevented at least 300,000 displaced persons from returning home during the year.

Historically, Central Sulawesi has shared certain similarities with the Moluccas, including an evenly divided population of Christians and Muslims and political and economic tensions. In April 2000, in the city of Poso, communal violence quickly escalated. Mobs killed numerous persons and destroyed vehicles and homes. LJ leveled entire villages, some of them Christian and some of which were home to Hindu migrants from Bali. Muslim and Christian religious leaders were accused of incitement. On September 10, police arrested Christian leader Rinaldy Damanik after they found firearms and ammunition in a vehicle in which he was travelling. Observers said Protestant and Muslim groups overreacted to violent incidents, with the effect that reciprocal attacks became exponentially more lethal. By the end of 2001, interreligious violence in the province had killed approximately 2,000 persons and displaced more than 100,000 persons.

In December 2001, the government's deployment of 4,000 elite soldiers and police helped dissipate the violence in Central Sulawesi in the wake of the Malino I peace agreement between the province's Christian and Muslim communities. Special police units that kept LJ fighters in check helped to reduce the bloodshed. During the year, amid a heavy security force presence, peaceful conditions prompted many internally displaced persons (IDPs) to return to their homes in the province. Residents removed many barricades, and the local economy revived. However, on June 5, a bomb exploded aboard a crowded passenger bus, killing five persons, including a Protestant minister. The Government responded by inserting additional security forces, which reinstituted a fragile peace that held for the rest of the year. During the year, violence in Central Sulawesi killed dozens of persons and prevented at least 113,000 IDPs from returning home, mostly in the Poso area.

In Kalimantan ethnic tensions continued, mainly between indigenous Dayaks and ethnic Madurese settlers. However, the two groups largely avoided bloodshed, unlike in 2001 when Dayaks killed hundreds of Madurese. However, some killings occurred, including the May 26 decapitation of an elderly Madurese man in the Kapuas district of Central Kalimantan (see Section 5). In late July, at least three Madurese were beheaded in the province, but police concluded that those killings were motivated criminally. In August the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) reported that approximately 41,000 persons in West Kalimantan were displaced. Virtually all were Madurese, most of whom were driven out of the city of Sambas in 1999 or 2000 and fled to Pontianak, capital of West Kalimantan. The Government relocated many to resettlement sites outside of Pontianak. Madurese groups, including the Madurese Students Association, criticized the Government for relocating Madurese IDPs to new sites, instead of escorting them back to the land they legally owned and ensuring their safety. The Government did not announce any progress in its investigation into the 2001 killings of ethnic Madurese.

Bombs exploded in or near the cities of Ambon, Banda Aceh, Bandung, Denpasar, Jakarta, Kuta, Manado, Medan, Palu and Poso, among others. On August 1, in Jakarta, a car bomb exploded, wounding the Philippine Ambassador and killing an Embassy guard and a woman who happened to be passing by the area. By year's end, it was still unclear who had carried out the attack, and investigators had not made any arrests. On September 23, in Jakarta, a grenade exploded inside a car as the occupants passed near a residence owned by a foreign embassy, killing the man handling the grenade and injuring the driver and another man, who both fled. The initial police statement indicated that this was a failed attack against a foreign diplomatic residence. Police subsequently captured three suspects. A government investigation continued at year's end. On October 12, two powerful bombs exploded in an entertainment district of Kuta, Bali, killing at least 186 persons, many of them foreign tourists. The bombings also injured 328 persons and destroyed 53 buildings. According to a senior police official, the incident was the most lethal terrorist attack in the country's history. Investigators subsequently arrested 15 suspects, at least 3 of whom reportedly acknowledged ties to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a terrorist group linked with al-Qa'ida. The investigation continued at year's end.

The Government made some progress in pursuing justice for previous bombings. On July 24, the Jakarta High Court handed a 20-year sentence to Malaysian citizen Taufik bin Abdul Halim for the August 2001 bombing of the city's Atrium shopping complex, which seriously injured six persons. Abdul Halim was carrying the bomb when it exploded prematurely. At year's end, the Supreme Court was reviewing his case. On July 18, the Supreme Court extended the prison term of 1 of 4 men convicted in the September 2000 bombing of the Jakarta Stock Exchange, which killed 15 persons. The court rejected the appeal by Tengku Ismuhadi Jafar and changed his 20-year sentence to life imprisonment. On October 19, the Government announced the arrest of alleged JI leader Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in connection with the 38 bombs that exploded across the archipelago on Christmas Eve 2000, which killed 19 persons and injured at least 120 others. The investigation continued at year's end.

Mobs carried out vigilante justice on many occasions, but reliable nationwide statistics were not available. Incidents of theft or perceived theft triggered many such incidents. On June 14, in the north Jakarta community of Tanjung Priok, pedicab drivers beat and severely injured two municipal guards. On June 20, in the West Java city of Tangerang, a mob burned to death a man who had allegedly stolen a television and a VCD player from a house. The man's fingers were removed, making a positive identification of the body more difficult. On August 26, hundreds of residents of the West Java town of Majalengka attacked and killed two plainclothes policemen suspected of stealing motorbikes. The victims were investigating reports of motorbike theft. On September 9, in the same city, a mob fatally assaulted a local resident after he attacked a motorcycle taxi driver and tried to steal the vehicle.

b. Disappearance

According to the Committee for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (Kontras), large numbers of persons who disappeared over the past 20 years, mainly in conflict areas, remained unaccounted for at year's end. In addition, hundreds of new disappearances were reported. Many of the disappearances occurred in Aceh, where according to the Aceh branch of Kontras, approximately 224 persons disappeared during the year.

At least three other disappearances took place in Papua. Some disappearances were motivated politically, while in other cases persons were kidnaped for ransom. Human rights organizations accused police and soldiers in Aceh of involvement in many of the disappearances; however, GAM also kidnaped many civilians for ransom. In many cases, little or no information was available regarding a victim's sudden disappearance. On January 28, in the village of Kuala, West Aceh, three adults and one infant disappeared while enroute to a plantation where the adults worked. On February 13, the village chief of Lhok Leubu, Pidie regency disappeared while returning from a shopping trip to a neighboring town. The Government did not take significant action to prevent the security forces from kidnaping civilians.

GAM rebels kidnaped and subsequently freed many people during the year. On June 30, suspected GAM rebels hijacked the Pelangi Frontier, a supply ship operating off the northern coast of Aceh, and took nine crewmen hostage. They released the crew a week later, with a statement that the release was based on confirmation that the crew was not associated with the military. Credible sources said that no ransom was paid. Also in June, the security forces accused the GAM of kidnaping nine athletes who were returning to the Acehnese town of Sigli from a sports competition in the city of Medan. According to a credible witness, armed rebels stopped the athletes' vehicle and released the driver and his assistant, but detained the athletes. In July they were released and no ransom was paid. The GAM denied responsibility and stated that the TNI had fabricated the story. In January in Peureulak, East Aceh, the GAM kidnaped and detained for 4 months nine high school students who were accused of spying for Brimob. The kidnapings came after soldiers located and killed three GAM rebels. One detainee alleged she had been raped. The Government did not investigate this allegation during the year and failed to announce any progress in investigations into other GAM-linked disappearances during the year.

The Government did not take significant action to prevent security force members from carrying out kidnapings. According to a credible human rights activist, police and soldiers in Aceh frequently and illegally detained citizens. The activist said dozens were held at any given time. It was unclear whether any such detainees died in custody during the year.

A number of ethnic Papuans disappeared during the year. On February 21, Martinus Maware, a former logging company employee and suspected OPM member, disappeared while under heavy guard at a military hospital, where he was being treated after soldiers guarding the company shot him in the leg during a dispute. On March 2, in the Central Java city of Salatiga, two men on a motorcycle kidnaped Mathius Rumbrapuk, one of four students convicted of subversion for a December 2000 demonstration in front of a foreign embassy. Rumbrapuk's friends alleged that the kidnapers were plainclothes policemen. There were no developments in the case of missing Papuan Hubertus Wresman, who was kidnaped from his parents' home by Kopassus troops in June 2001 according to Amnesty International (AI) and Wresman's relatives. The Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy (ELS HAM) reported that Wresman participated in an attack on a military post that killed four soldiers several months before he disappeared.

The Government made slight progress in its investigation into the July 1996 attack by hundreds of progovernment civilians and soldiers on the Jakarta headquarters of what was then the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI); 23 persons disappeared and 5 persons died in the attack. In September Jakarta prosecutors said they had received three police dossiers on suspects, who finally were being placed on trial. Prosecutors returned two other dossiers to the police, which they described as incomplete. One named General Sutiyoso, Jakarta's military commander in 1996 and current Governor, as a suspect.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The Criminal Code makes it a crime punishable by up to 4 years in prison for any official to use violence or force to elicit a confession. In practice, law enforcement officials widely ignored such statutes. Security forces continued to employ torture and other forms of abuse to produce confessions and as a form of punishment. Police often resorted to physical abuse, even in minor incidents.

During the year, the security forces committed numerous acts of torture in Aceh. According to the Aceh branch of Kontras, 1,472 persons were tortured in the province during the year. On May 6, the military released Acehnese Rizki Muhammad, after more than 1 week of detention, during which soldiers allegedly clubbed and burned him with molten plastic. Kontras stated that on May 19, soldiers in the north Aceh village of Alue Dua visited the home of farmer Nurdin Doni, a suspected GAM member. When they learned he was not home, they broke his wife's feet and forced the couple's three children, aged 8 to 14, to stand in a fish pond for 3 hours. The Government did not hold anyone responsible, nor did it launch an investigation into the case. On May 24, a joint military/police squad questioned M. Thaleb, in the village of Meunasah Blouk, Blang Mangat subdistrict. The troops accused Thaleb of being a GAM member and tortured him, peeling some of the skin off his face and causing injuries to his lips and teeth. On June 6, in the north Aceh village of Jawa-Banda Sakti, three Brimob policemen entered the home of Syahrul Gunawan and inflicted severe injuries to his head, eyes, nose, and cheeks.

Police in Papua occasionally also tortured detainees, and in rare cases, their injuries resulted in death. On July 31, according to ELS HAM, Yanuarius Usi died in police custody as a result of torture.

Rapes, some punitive, occurred frequently in conflict zones. Human rights advocates blamed many of the rapes on soldiers and police. Statistics were unavailable, but credible sources provided a number of accounts that involved both soldiers and police. Kontras stated that in April, for an unknown reason, police arrested a 17-year-old girl at her home in the Acehnese village of Ulee Blang. They forcibly intoxicated her with alcohol then raped her. An interfaith organization operating in Poso, Central Sulawesi, reported that high rates of depression among female IDPs because many had been raped and impregnated by Brimob members.

There were no reports during the year that East Timorese women were held against their will as sex slaves in West Timor, as had been alleged in previous years.

During the year, there was no progress in the government's probe into the May 1998 civil unrest in Jakarta and other cities, which included attacks against Sino-Indonesian women. However, in December, KOMNASHAM set up a team to investigate the incident.

Occasionally Brimob personnel used arson as a form of punishment. On October 9, an Aceh police official said 40 police officers, some from Brimob, were questioned for allegedly burning down 80 shops and homes. None were prosecuted. Witnesses said police started the fires after GAM members killed two policemen. The GAM burned numerous rural schools and other government buildings during the year. Credible sources stated that GAM was implicated in the June 14 and 15 torching of seven schools, four of which were located in the city of Lhokseumawe.

During the year, Islamic extremists attacked a number of nightclubs, ostensibly to punish them for tolerating or promoting vice. The Islam

Defenders Front (FPI) in Jakarta carried out many such attacks, during which prostitutes sometimes were assaulted. On March 7, the eve of the Islamic New Year, hundreds of FPI members attacked a pool hall in South Jakarta after approaching bars and discotheques in Central Jakarta and demanding that they close out of respect for the holiday. On June 26, approximately 200 FPI members smashed beer bottles, signs and windows in the popular Jaksa street area of Jakarta, in full view of police. On October 4, 400 FPI members attacked a billiard hall and discotheque in West Jakarta, angered that they were open on a Muslim holiday. Following those attacks, however, police arrested 13 FPI members and charged 8 of them with disturbing the peace. Community and religious leaders praised these arrests. On October 16, police also arrested FPI Chairman Habib Rizieq in connection with cases of vandalism and violence going back to 2000.

Prison conditions were harsh, with 12 inmates typically sharing a 2-meter by 4-meter cell. Guards regularly extorted money and mistreated inmates. The wealthy or privileged had access to better treatment in prison. In July Hutomo "Tommy Suharto" Mandala Putra started serving a 15-year sentence at Batu prison on the island of Nusakambangan, off of Java's south coast. Tempo magazine reported that his cell, unlike most, had a bathroom of its own and no bars on the windows. Prison authorities housed female inmates separately from men, but in similar conditions. Juveniles were not separated from adults. There was no official restriction against prison visits by human rights monitors. In practice, prison officials and guards rarely provided access, although the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) visited convicted prisoners on occasion.

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

The Criminal Procedures Code contains provisions against arbitrary arrest and detention, but lacks adequate enforcement mechanisms, and authorities routinely violated it. The code provides prisoners with the right to notify their families promptly and specifies that warrants must be produced during an arrest (except if, for example, a suspect is caught in the act of committing a crime). The law allows investigators to issue warrants, but, at times, authorities made arrests without warrants. No reliable statistics exist on how many arbitrary arrests and detentions took place during the year.

A defendant may challenge the legality of his arrest and detention in a pretrial hearing and may sue for compensation if wrongfully detained. However, it was virtually impossible for detainees to invoke this procedure or to receive compensation after being released without charge. Military and civilian courts rarely accepted appeals based on claims of improper arrest and detention. The Criminal Procedures Code also limits periods of pretrial detention and specifies when the courts must approve extensions, usually after 60 days. The courts generally respected these limits. The authorities routinely approved extensions of periods of detention.

In areas of separatist conflict, such as Aceh and Papua, police frequently and arbitrarily detained persons without warrants, charges, or court proceedings. The authorities rarely granted bail. The authorities frequently prevented access to defense counsel during investigations, and limited or prevented access to legal assistance from voluntary legal defense organizations. It was unclear whether any person died while in custody during the year.

On October 18, the Government issued two decrees on terrorism that allow it to use evidence from wiretaps, video recordings, and other surveillance previously inadmissible in court to fight terrorism (see Section 1.f.). The first decree loosened restrictions on evidence to prosecute terrorists; allowed up to 7 days of detention based solely on intelligence reports; and provided the police with authority to hold suspects for whom there was stronger evidence for 6 months without the authority of prosecutors or judges. The second decree stipulates that the first decree can be applied retroactively to detain suspects who were involved in the October 12 bombings. The country's largest Islamic organizations and parties across the political spectrum publicly supported the decrees. Some human rights NGOs raised concerns that the decrees could facilitate human rights abuses, but prominent human rights lawyers judged the safeguards were better than those in other parts of the Criminal Code.

In Aceh security forces routinely employed arbitrary arrest and detention without trial. On July 16, in Banda Aceh, local police took seven young members of the Acehnese Women's Democratic Organization (ORPAD) into custody following a rally in which they expressed antigovernment views. The police released six of the seven women a day later, but continued to hold Raihana Diani, who helped organize the rally, through the end of the year. The authorities charged her with insulting the President, a violation of Articles 134 and 137 of the Criminal Code. On December 23, prosecutors demanded a sentence of 8 months. At year's end, Diani still was awaiting sentencing. On July 31, in Papua, Yanuarius Usi allegedly died in police custody as a result of mistreatment (see Section 1.c.). On September 26, police in Jakarta arrested and briefly detained anticorruption activist Azas Tigor Nainggolan. Tigor, Chairman of the Jakarta Residents Forum (FAKTA), allegedly slandered Jakarta Governor Sutiyoso by claiming that he had bribed city councilors.

On September 11, in southern Aceh, the TNI detained two foreign women in an area off limits to foreigners. The soldiers denied them Consular access and, according to the two women, punched and sexually harassed them. The TNI subsequently turned the two over to police, who transferred them to Banda Aceh, where they were charged with violating the terms of their tourist visas. On December 30, a court convicted them for violating the terms of their tourist visas, sentencing one to 4 months in prison and the other to 5 months.

On April 17, police in Jakarta released imprisoned Acehnese student leader Fasial Saifuddin, pending appeal of his 1-year sentence for "spreading hatred

toward the state." Saifuddin, of the NGO SIRA, had demonstrated in front of the United Nations (U.N.) building in Jakarta; he had served approximately 6 months of his sentence. In November 2001, police in Banda Aceh released from detention student leader Kautsar Mohammed, who was held on the same charge as Saifuddin.

The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government did not employ it.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

The Constitution provides for judicial independence. However, in practice, the judiciary remained subordinate to the Executive and was often influenced by the military, business interests, and politicians outside of the legal system. The law requires that the Justice Ministry gradually transfer administrative and financial control over the judiciary to the Supreme Court by 2004. However, judges were civil servants employed by the executive branch, which controlled their assignments, pay, and promotion. Low salaries encouraged corruption, and judges were subject to pressure from governmental authorities, which often influenced the outcome of cases.

Under the Supreme Court is a quadripartite judiciary of general, religious, military, and administrative courts. The law provides for the right of appeal, sequentially, from a district court to a High Court to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court does not consider factual aspects of a case, but rather the lower court's application of the law. The judicial branch was theoretically equal to the executive and legislative branches and had the right of judicial review over laws passed by the DPR, as well as government regulations and presidential, ministerial, and gubernatorial decrees.

At the district court level, a panel of judges conducts trials by posing questions, hearing evidence, deciding on guilt or innocence, and assessing punishment. Judges rarely reversed initial judgments in the appeals process, although they lengthened or shortened sentences. Both the defense and prosecution can appeal verdicts.

The law presumes that defendants are innocent until proven guilty and permits bail. Defendants have the right to confront witnesses and call witnesses in their defense. An exception is allowed in cases in which distance or expense is deemed excessive for transporting witnesses to court; in such cases, sworn affidavits may be introduced. Prosecutors were reluctant to plea bargain with defendants or witnesses, or to grant witnesses immunity from prosecution. As a result, many witnesses were unwilling to testify, particularly against government officials. The courts often allowed forced confessions and limited the presentation of defense evidence. Defendants did not have the right to remain silent and some were compelled to testify against themselves.

The Criminal Procedures Code gives defendants the right to an attorney from the time of arrest, but not during the prearrest investigative period, which may involve prolonged detention. Persons summoned to appear as witnesses in investigations do not have the right to legal assistance. The law requires counsel to be appointed in capital punishment cases and those involving a prison sentence of 15 years or more. In cases involving potential sentences of 5 years or more, the law requires the appointment of an attorney if the defendant is indigent and requests counsel. In theory indigent defendants may obtain private legal assistance, but in practice authorities persuaded many defendants not to hire an attorney. In many cases, procedural protections, including those against forced confessions, were inadequate to ensure a fair trial. Widespread corruption continued throughout the legal system. Bribes influenced prosecution, conviction, and sentencing in countless civil and criminal cases.

A military justice system exists and during the course of the year, members of the armed forces were prosecuted, generally for common crimes.

Four district courts exist to adjudicate gross human rights violations. The law provides for each to have five members, including three noncareer human rights judges, who are appointed to 5-year terms. Verdicts may be appealed to the standing High Court and Supreme Court. The law provides for internationally recognized definitions of genocide, crimes against humanity, and command responsibility, but it does not include war crimes as a gross violation of human rights. The law stipulates the powers of the Attorney General, who is the sole investigating and prosecuting authority in cases of gross human rights violations, and who is empowered to appoint ad hoc investigators and prosecutors. The law also empowers the Attorney General (as well as the courts) to detain suspects or defendants for multiple fixed periods in cases of gross human rights violations. However, the law requires the Human Rights Court to approve the extension of any detention of suspected human rights violators. For gross human rights violations that occurred before the enactment of the law, the law allows the President, with the recommendation of the DPR, to create an ad hoc bench within one of the human rights courts to hear cases associated with a particular offense.

On March 14, the ad hoc human rights tribunal for East Timor convened in Jakarta after the government failed to investigate instances of gross human rights abuses within the timeframes stipulated by the human rights tribunal law. According to a broad interpretation of this law, the attorney general should have commenced prosecution no later than February 23, 2001, or a maximum of 310 days after the formation of his special investigative team on April 19, 2000. A stricter reading of the statute would have moved forward the deadline for prosecution by approximately 3 months, or 310 days after Komnasham provided the results of its inquiry into the East Timor atrocities on January 31, 2000. The DPR did not recommend the tribunal's establishment until March 2001; the presidential decree authorizing its establishment was withheld until late the following month, and the government deferred selection of non-career tribunal jurists until mid-January. The government's failure to meet statutory deadlines in preparing cases for the tribunal represented a major procedural violation that could provide grounds to overturn any convictions on appeal.

In his April 2001 decree creating the tribunal, former President Wahid limited the tribunal's jurisdiction over East Timor atrocities to those that occurred after the August 30, 1999 referendum. In August 2001, President Megawati allowed the tribunal to also include selected incidents that occurred in East Timor during April 1999, thus retroactively applying the country's human rights statutes to East Timor cases for the first time. However, President Megawati's decree limited the tribunal's jurisdiction to only those atrocities that occurred during April 1999 and September 1999 in 3 locations: Liquica, Dili, and Suai. The time and geographic restrictions placed on the tribunal's jurisdiction complicated prosecutors' ability to demonstrate that the atrocities in East Timor throughout 1999 were gross human rights abuses, defined as a systematic and widespread pattern of abuse by security force officers and their militia proxies. Legal experts said that in order to win a conviction in the tribunal, it was crucial to prove that such a pattern of abuse occurred. Pursuant to the august 2001 presidential decree, prosecutors brought charges against only 18 of the individuals implicated in East Timor atrocities by the January 2000 Komnasham inquiry report.

The East Timor ad hoc human rights tribunal convened its first trial in March and concluded 14 of 18 trials during the year. Only one member of the security forces was found guilty in connection with 1999 violence in the former Indonesian territory. The court convicted army Lt. Col. Soedjarwo of crimes against humanity for failing to prevent pro-Jakarta militiamen from attacking the Dili seaside home and office of Archbishop Belo, where a number of civilians had taken refuge, and at least 13 persons were killed. Soedjarwo was sentenced to 5 years in jail. The tribunal also convicted two other persons, both civilians. Former East Timor Governor Abilio Soares was sentenced to 3 years, and former Aitarak militia leader Eurico Guterres--like Soares an ethnic East Timorese--received a 10-year sentence. Tribunal law mandates a 10-year minimum term of imprisonment. All three persons convicted remained free at year's end, pending their appeals. Most of the 18 persons indicted were low- and mid-level officers and officials. All were charged as responsible parties to the 1999 massacres at Liquica church (April 6) and at Manuel Carrascalao's home in Dili (April 17), as well as those at the Dili diocese (September 5), and at Archbishop Belo's home and the Suai church (September 6).

In all of the trials, prosecutors presented weak cases that failed to prove the defendants' involvement in gross human rights abuses. Prosecutors did not fully use the resources or evidence available to them from the UN and elsewhere in documenting the atrocities in East Timor, and called few East Timorese witnesses. Most of their remaining witnesses were themselves defendants in other cases in the tribunal's docket. In some cases, judges harassed witnesses and/or disregarded their testimony, which highlighted concern over the overall fairness of the judicial process. In addition, the regular presence in the gallery of substantial numbers of uniformed military personnel and their East Timorese supporters intimidated witnesses. In one case, judges failed to authorize an interpreter's participation in the trial, with the effect that a witness was unable to testify in her native language, Tetum. Consequently, the witness was compelled to testify in rudimentary Indonesian, which resulted in heckling by soldiers present in the courtroom, which the judges made no attempt to control. UN Human Rights Chief Mary Robinson said the results of the trials were "not satisfying in terms of international human rights standards."

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or Correspondence

The law requires judicial warrants for searches except for cases involving subversion, economic crimes, and corruption. Nevertheless, security officials occasionally broke into homes and offices. The authorities generally did not monitor private communications but they occasionally spied on individuals and their residences, and listened in on telephone calls. There were reports that the Government occasionally infringed upon privacy rights of migrant workers returning from abroad, particularly women. Corrupt officials sometimes subjected the migrants to arbitrary strip searches, expropriated valuables, ordered currency conversions at below-market rates, and extracted bribes at special lanes set aside at airports for returning workers.

On January 8, President Megawati signed the Law on Overcoming Dangerous Situations, which provides the military broad powers in a declared state of emergency, such as limiting land, air and sea traffic, and ordering people to relocate. However, the Government did not implement the law during the year (see Section 2.d.). On May 23, in Maluku Province, after attempts to formally impose martial law met widespread opposition, Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono announced that an Army General would lead both the military and the police in the province. Kontras and other NGOs criticized the move, arguing that restructuring the command system amounted to imposition of martial law.

Human rights activists increasingly viewed the national identity card (KTP) system as a form of government interference in the privacy of citizens. The KTPs, which all citizens are required to carry, identifies the holder's religion. NGOs charged that the KTPs undermined the country's secular tradition and endangered cardholders who traveled through an area of interreligious conflict. Members of the five religions officially recognized by the Government--Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism and Buddhism--had little or no trouble obtaining accurate identification cards during the year; however, members of minority religions, frequently were denied a card, or denied one that accurately reflected their faith (see Section 2.c.).

In many parts of the archipelago, particularly in Kalimantan and Papua, indigenous persons believed that the government-sponsored transmigration

program interfered with their traditional ways of life, land usage, and economic opportunities. During the year, the program moved 103,218 households from overpopulated areas to more isolated and less developed areas. The Government sent 21,617 households to Central Kalimantan, making that province the top destination.

The Government used its authority, and at times intimidation, to appropriate land for development projects, particularly in areas claimed by indigenous people, and often without fair compensation.

The law provides KOMNASHAM statutory authority to write legislation and allows for a membership of 35. However, the DPR selected only 23 persons. It was unclear how, or whether, the remaining 12 seats would be filled. Critics faulted the legislators for passing over a number of outspoken human rights campaigners.

The law also provides KOMNASHAM with subpoena powers. Disputes that were settled by written agreement through the Commission were enforceable legally in court. The law does not give KOMNASHAM the power to enforce its recommendations, however, and in July one former member reported that the Government ignored over 80 percent of the panel's recommendations.

On July 8, the DPR announced the selection of 23 KOMNASHAM members, 5 of whom were members of the previous panel. Some activists said obstructionists within KOMNASHAM systematically weakened the Commission by suppressing probes and arranging for human rights cases to be transferred to the police. The law provides KOMNASHAM statutory authority to write legislation and allows for a membership of 35. However, the DPR selected only 23 persons. It was unclear how, or whether, the remaining 12 seats would be filled. Critics faulted the legislators for passing over a number of outspoken human rights campaigners. The law also provides KOMNASHAM with subpoena powers. Disputes that were settled by written agreement through the Commission were enforceable legally in court. The law does not give KOMNASHAM the power to enforce its recommendations, however, and in July one former member reported that the Government ignored over 80 percent of the panel's recommendations.