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Where nationalisms collide - History is central to the politics
of West Papua
Inside Indonesia, Jul - Sep 2001
Richard Chauvel
In late May and early June 2000, thousands of Papuans gathered to
attend the Second Papuan Congress. Its name drew a connection with
the first congress held in 1961, before Papua became a part of
Indonesia. Its purpose: to 'correct the course of Papuan history'.
The history that Papuan nationalists sought to correct was that of
Papua's integration into Indonesia during the 1960s. Their
interpretation of it was summarised in the first three resolutions
of the congress:
The people of Papua have been sovereign as a nation and a state
since 1 December 1961.
The people of Papua, through the Second Congress, reject the 1962
New York Agreement on moral and legal grounds as the agreement was
made without any Papuan representation.
The people of Papua, through the Second Congress, reject the results
of Pepera (the Act of Free Choice) because it was conducted under
coercion, intimidation, sadistic killings, military violence and
immoral conduct contravening humanitarian principles. Accordingly,
the people of Papua demand that the United Nations revoke resolution
2504, 19 December [sic - actually November] 1969.
History is no less important for Indonesian nationalists. Indonesia
conducted a twelve-year long campaign to force the Netherlands to
relinquish control of the last remnant of Indonesia. President
Sukarno constructed the struggle to 'return' West Irian as an issue
to unify the nation to complete the revolution. Sukarno's campaign
enjoyed the support of all prominent political leaders and parties.
Indonesians derive satisfaction from the fact that, through the UN's
acceptance of the results of the 1969 Act of Free Choice, the
international community had endorsed the process through which West
Irian was 'returned'.
Sukarno's daughter, the now vice president Megawati Sukarnoputri,
captured the sense of pride many Indonesians feel when in 1999 she
recalled a childhood conversation with her father. Why had he
visited Irian, it was so far away, she had asked. To which he
replied: 'Without Irian Jaya Indonesia is not completeThe words
ironically echoed those of the Dutch at the time of Indonesia's
independence struggle: 'The Indies lost, everything lost'.
Backwater
West Papua was incorporated into the Netherlands East Indies during
the nineteenth century more to pre-empt Germany, Britain or the
Australian colonies taking an interest rather than for any economic
or political advantage. Until the Netherlands transferred
sovereignty to an independent Indonesia in December 1949, West Papua
remained an economic and administrative backwater. West Papua was
where the colonial Dutch exiled Indonesian nationalists as well as
their own less successful officials.
Until the Pacific War West Papua was administered in conjunction
with the neighbouring Maluku islands to the west. Many Ambonese,
Keiese and Menadonese were employed as officials, police, teachers
and missionaries. This gave the colonial administration a curious
duality. It was as much east Indonesian as it was Dutch. Papuan
Christianity and use of the Malay (Indonesian) language was strongly
influenced by the east Indonesian teachers and missionaries. As the
first generation of the Papuan elite graduated from Dutch schools,
the jobs they aspired to were held by east Indonesians. In the small
urban centres of Netherlands New Guinea, educated Papuans shaped
their political and cultural identities in reference to the east
Indonesians.
After the Pacific War, Papua's separation from the rest of the
archipelago became more distinct. Under the first post-war Resident,
J P K van Eechoud, boarding schools were established to train
Papuans as officials, police, soldiers and teachers. Van Eechoud
recruited students from throughout Papua with the explicit intention
of cultivating a sense of pan-Papuan identity. The graduates of Van
Eechoud's schools were prominent among the first generations of the
Papuan elite. Notwithstanding the strong demands of the east
Indonesian federalists, Papua was not included in the State of East
Indonesia. In 1946 the Netherlands became a member of the South
Pacific Commission as the administering power of West Papua.
Although the administrative separation of Papua from Maluku had been
achieved, it was not until mid-1949 that the Dutch cabinet decided
to exclude Papua from the impending transfer of sovereignty to
Indonesia. The status of West Papua was left unresolved at the
crucial Round Table Conference that brought together Dutch and
Indonesian negotiators. The resulting compromise enabled the
transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia, but kept West Papua under
Dutch control until its constitutional status could be settled
through further negotiations within a year. Both the United States
and Australia supported the Netherlands' resolve to exclude West
Papua from the transfer of sovereignty.
Negotiations at the end of 1950 as well as those of following years
failed to resolve the conflict. In 1954 Indonesia took the dispute
to the United Nations, where in that year, 1956 and 1957, it failed
to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority in the General Assembly.
The dispute over West Papua was a significant factor in the
breakdown of post-colonial relations between Indonesia and the
Netherlands.
The motives behind the Netherlands' determination to retain control
of Papua were complex and at least as much related to domestic
political factors as to the maintenance of Dutch interests in
Indonesia. Van Maarseveen, the Minister for Overseas Territories,
expressed to parliament in 1949 the principal public rationale: 'New
Guinea does not belong to Indonesia proper. New Guinea is separate
from Indonesia geographically, ethnographically and also
politically. New Guinea forms a completely separate territory with a
separate history.'
In 1952 self-determination for Papuans became an objective of
Netherlands policy. However, not a great deal was done to further
this objective until 1960, when under increasing international
pressure the Netherlands began a program of accelerated political
advancement. Over a ten-year period this was to lead to an
independent West Papua. The decolonisation program involved
establishing a representative council, increasing involvement of
Papuans in the administration to replace Europeans and Indonesians,
and establishing a Papuan volunteer corps. Like van Eechoud over a
decade earlier, the political purpose was to create a sense of unity
and a national ideal among the diverse peoples of the territory.
Political parties, both pro-Indonesian and pro-Dutch, had been
established in the late 1940s. However, political activity began to
flourish among the Papuan elite with the elections for the New
Guinea Council. Papuan leaders became keenly aware that the fate of
their homeland was the object of an international dispute, in which
they attempted to participate, but ultimately had little influence.
Symbols
It was in this atmosphere of rapid political change in West Papua
and its enmeshment in the politics of the Cold War that Papuans
first formulated their national ideals and created national symbols.
On 19 October 1961 the Komite Nasional Papoea, under the leadership
of members of the New Guinea Council, issued a political manifesto.
It urged the government of Netherlands New Guinea to permit the
Papuan flag to be flown besides the Dutch flag, the Papuan anthem to
be sung with the Dutch 'Wilhelmus', and the name of the territory to
be West Papua and its people Papuan. On behalf of the Papuan people,
the manifesto demanded that they be given a place among the free
peoples of the world, live in peace and contribute to the
maintenance of world peace.
On 1 December 1961, in front of the New Guinea Council, in the
presence of the governor, members of the council and political party
leaders, the 'Morning Star' was raised for the first time and the 'Hai
Tanahku Papua' sung. This day has come to be regarded as Papuan
Independence Day.
Protracted negotiations under UN auspices followed, accompanied by
Indonesian military infiltration and driven by an American
determination to see the dispute resolved in Indonesia's favour. In
August 1962, the Netherlands and Indonesia signed the New York
Agreement. Control of West Papua would pass from the Netherlands to
Indonesia after a period of UN administration.
In the capital Hollandia (later renamed Jayapura), the New Guinea
Council building became a focus for well-organised and
well-supported demonstrations against the agreement. At the first
such demonstration M W Kaisiepo, a leading member of the council and
of the Komite Nasional Papoea, condemned the agreement: 'We were
traded as goats by the Americans'.
The New York Agreement's provision for an act of self-determination
under UN supervision may have been a face-saving formula for the
Dutch, but it was recognised as critical by Papuans. Many Papuans
argued that it should be held in 1963 under the UN administration,
rather than in 1969 under the Indonesians. As reflected in the
resolutions of the Second Papuan Congress, the injustice,
manipulation and repression that characterised Indonesian conduct of
the Act of Free Choice has now become central to Papuan
understandings of their history.
The Papuan nationalist interpretation of the conduct of the Act of
Free Choice has found support in recent archival research based on
previously classified UN documents as well as on Netherlands, United
States, British and Australian government sources. John Saltford
argues that under the 1962 New York Agreement 'the Netherlands,
Indonesia and the UN had an obligation to protect the political
rights and freedoms of the Papuans, and to ensure that an act of
self-determination took place, in accordance with international
practice. On both these points, the three parties failed, and they
did so deliberately since genuine Papuan self-determination was
never seen as an option by any of them once the [New York] Agreement
was signed.'
Papuan resistance to Indonesian authority emerged soon after the
transfer of administrative control. The Free Papua
Organisation(Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM) was formed in 1964 and
became the principal institution to wage an armed resistance against
the Indonesian government. The resistance was sporadic, ad hoc and
local. It never threatened Indonesian control of Papua. However,
although the OPM's military capacity was limited, its representation
of Papuan identity and national aspirations was of much greater
importance.
Richard Chauvel (richard.chauvel@vu.edu.au) teaches at Victoria
University, Melbourne, Australia. He is writing a book on the West
New Guinea dispute and researches contemporary Papuan politics.
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