Wednesday, June 19, 2002 05:14:00 AM

Chiapas al Dia, No. 292 CIEPAC Chiapas, Mexico May 29, 2002 - Networks and Netwars: Notes on Ants and Steam Rollers

In a recent "Chiapas al Da" bulletin (no. 289) we pointed out that networks and netwars have attracted the attention of US government strategists. We will go deeper in this bulletin because it's worthwhile to understand how civil society organizations (CSOs) and their networks in Chiapas, in Mexico and other parts of the world are being affected, but also, most importantly, it's worthwhile knowing what measures are being taken and could be taken in the near future to control advancement of these networks.

What follows is taken mainly from a book that came out shortly after last year's September 11 attacks, written by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Rand Corporation analysts, one of the main
thinks tanks of the US armed forces.(1) Arquilla and Ronfeldt claim in a concluding chapter that they feel vindicated after September 11 regarding the need to understand the rapid rise of networks and netwars in the last few years, given that Al Qaeda is supposedly structured as a network and not along traditional hierarchical lines.

Networks are made up of all types of individuals: terrorists, narcotics traffickers, other types of traffickers, urban gangs, even citizens that fight for "noble causes". The tactics and the ways of organizing are surprisingly similar in all cases, and what's alarming for defense analysts, particularly in the US, is that these networks have obtained surprising results lately.

The authors posit that networks, whether they have a "sinister" or "amiable" objective, are organized with certain characteristics, and struggle with similar strategies and tactics. To defeat them, or at least detain and control their advance, the "forces of law and order" will have to, first, understand the nature of networks and, second, develop new methods of struggle, because previous methods are no longer entirely effective. For those of us organized in networks of civil organizations, peacefully promoting noble causes, what interests us is similar: we must understand the paradigm of netwars, see if in fact the advances obtained by civil society are due to having acted within networks, as Arquilla and Ronfeldt maintain, and see what is on the horizon regarding a response. 

Because there will be most certainly a response. People in the US are convinced that they will be attacked with weapons of mass destruction, either nuclear bombs or germ-warfare bombs. These are not scenarios that are constructed only within military circles. Major newspapers are openly saying "it's not a question if we will be attacked with weapons of mass destruction, but when".(2) Although analyzed from a military viewpoint, the offensive against networks that is sure to come from the US will also have its applications in civilian life, in counterinsurgency operations. This is not unusual; internet itself was first developed by the US armed forces to maintain permanent contact among its operation centers and bases in case of a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union, and today it has its well-known civilian applications.

But could the networks of social organizations really be a reason to worry in the upper reaches of the strategic defense apparatus? Aren't the CSOs just really a few ants that struggle without much success against much larger and better-financed rivals...such as the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and multinational corporations? We said in Bulletin No. 289 that there is in fact worry because the networks of social organizations have had some notable successes that have made the executives in certain economic organizations blink nervously. The implicit threat is obvious: those pesky ants, organized in networks and undertaking "netwars", have stopped, even briefly, that steamroller called neoliberalism. Therein lies the threat for Washington: the prevailing economic model is being threatened by ants.

As Arquilla and Ronfeldt have stated, "Non-governmental players...throughout the world are now strong enough that they cannot be overlooked by security strategists".

We mentioned previously (Bulletin 289) the success registered by the social organizations that undertook net-struggle in 1999 to sabotage and then detain the World Trade Organization summit meeting in Seattle. But there are other examples. An oft-studied case is the World Campaign against Landmines. From the concern of a few people, that then spread to CSOs, that then linked up in networks, a massive, world movement was created that was able to strengthen
an international treaty against landmines. The treaty originally encountered the stiff opposition from the US government, which finally gave in due to the intensity of the campaign. The Campaign against Landmines went on to win the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997.

Another example in the economic realm was the pressure that social organizations throughout the world applied in 1998 against the MIA (Multilateral Investment Agreement) that would have turned over even greater power to large multinational corporations.

In Chiapas there was recently a victory of CSOs that undertook net-struggle and were able to detain an inequitable bio-prospecting project, called ICBG-Maya, headed by the University of Georgia, the British company Molecular Nature Limited, the Colegio de la Frontera Sur (in San Cristbal, Chiapas), and several federal agencies of the US government. Thanks to the COMPITCH (Chiapas Council of Traditional Indigenous Doctors and Midwifes) network, indigenous communities in Chiapas were warned of this project's activities, and then, with other sympathetic networks in Mexico and abroad, brought sufficient pressure to bear, basically through information
campaigns, to force the project to a halt.

The victory was real enough, although obviously the war against bio-piracy hasn't been won, and even this victory could be shortlived, insofar as rumors abound that similar projects, under different guises, are underway in the Lacandon jungle. Regardless, this success of networks in Chiapas, in coordination with networks in Mexico and abroad, showed that the "ants" are in fact capable of organizing and working together efficiently for a cause, can win the solidarity of the general public, confront a bigger enemy and prevail.

Let us see in greater detail, then, what Arquilla and Ronfeldt say regarding networks and their new tactics. We stress again that the authors take in everyone organized in networks, from "terrorists" to citizens concerned about the environment. They define the term netwar as a new method of conflict (and crime) in society, without being traditional military wars, where protagonists use methods of organizing in networks, as well as doctrines, strategies, and related technologies, in tune with the information age. The protagonists tend to be dispersed organizations, small groups and individuals, that communicate, coordinate and undertake their
campaigns in an interconnected way, often without a centralized line of command. Thus netwar differs from the methods of conflict and crime in which protagonists prefer to develop formal and
hierarchical organizations, using doctrines and strategies from the past, for example, building centralized movements according to Leninist orientation. Netwars then has more to do with the Zapatistas that with the Fidelistas, more with Hamas than with the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The information revolution is transforming the nature of conflict and is favoring and strengthening network organizing methods, giving the latter at times an advantage over more hierarchical forms of organization. With the growth of networks, power is "migrating" towards non-governmental actors, since they can organize in extensive multi-organization networks. In particular these networks can have multiple connections, where all nodes are interconnected.

Another characteristic of these networks is that they can arise, organize activities and then disappear with great speed. In other words their flexible, agile structures, often without a guiding leader, can act as circumstances dictate, according to foe's weaknesses uncovered along the way. Their actions are often determined by consensus.

The advantages of network organizing over hierarchical forms are evident: since there is no single leader, his/her disappearance does not imply the breakup of the network or its activities. Its fluidity and flexibility allows it to be assembled, carry out actions and then, if need be, disappear, more quickly than what hierarchical forms of organizations would permit.

Certainly the information revolution (internet, cell telephones, fax machines, etc.) has been important for the networks to grow and function, since it has permitted members to interact over enormous distances. But it should be emphasized that netwar is not just war through the internet. Netwar isn't about hackers breaking into the web pages of opponents, violating security
restrictions in order to wreck havoc. 

It's more complex, having to do with the following levels:

Organizational-how the network is constructed. Discourse-what
is said about the network's raison d'etre. Doctrine-strategies
and methods of working together. Technological-the information
systems in use. Social-the personal links that guarantee
loyalty and trust.

At the organizational level it has been found that where struggles have succeded, the CSOs are linked in an irregular spiderweb fashion, with a number of "centers" and an extended periphery, and nodes are found at the intersection of threads. In this model, there is no obvious hierarchy. Eliminating one of the points, or nodes, is usually not fatal to the network, and the interconnection among the remaining points allows the structure to remain and to continue working, even when several nodes are missing. Leadership continues to be important, but there is no single chain of command and often there are several coordinated chains.

The level of discourse is one of the more interesting because it underscores the importance of aggressively disseminating what the network is all about. This has to do with the way network objectives are determined, and the way they are transmitted in order to win the hearts and minds of a wider public. The discourse is not solely for external consumption. Networks, like other forms of organization, are held together by the discourses that are elaborated, because they reflect the experiences, interests and values of their members. Discourses express identity and belonging, who we are, why we have come together, and why we are different from "others" (opponents). Discourses communicate a sense of cause, purpose and mission, and express goals and methods, sometimes embodying cultural and ethnic values.

A convincing discourse is a sort of glue that can help to keep people together, that because of network's informal structure and fluidity, might otherwise desert. An effective discourse also
creates bridges between different networks and can help to generate a feeling that the movement is on the march and winning. 

Going back to the ICBG-Maya project in 2001, it's clear that the discourse fashioned by the indigenous and mestizo networks was able to convince a wide spectrum of public opinion regarding the merits behind their cause. On the other hand, the discourse of their opponents (the University of Georgia, Professor Berlin, and the Colegio de la Frontera Sur, in particular) was skillfully debunked, even in hardly neutral territory, such as at the University of Georgia, where a colloquium was held on the subject. The ICBG-Maya's discourse was so feeble that its members tried to discredit opponents, alleging with a hint of racism that the Indians had been coopted and fooled by "non-Indian advisors".

Doctrine is important because it helps to explain how members of a network can operate tactically and strategically, without a fixed chain of command or leader. In spiderweb-like networks, actions can depend on deeply ingrained shared practices and principles, shared by all the nodes. These principles and practices, which make up a doctrine, allow network actors to "be of one mind", even though they are scattered and working on different tasks.

Actors in a network tend to favor two doctrinal practices. On the one hand they try to create networks without a single central leader. They may have several leaders, who may use or construct mechanisms to make consensus decisions. Second, social networks have often used "swarming" strategies and tactics, which "gang up" on opponents. This is done by coordinating the convergence of numerous small nodes, that are generally separated, at a particular target from several directions to undertake an "attack" and then disperse again in preparation for the next operation. 

Obviously the most spectacular example, the "mother of all swarms", was the September 11 attacks. The attacks by the alleged members of Al Qaeda that day were almost a definition-perfect swarming attack (exception made of the suicide attackers who will never be able to regroup).

Swarming by members of civil society networks has occurred when thousands of activists gathered in different cities around the world (Seattle, Genoa, Cancun, Quebec, Madrid, Prague, etc.),
generally to build "counter-summits" and protest against the organizations behind today's economic globalization (World Bank, World Trade Organization, etc.).

Predictably, these gatherings of activists have not had a solitary chain of command. Rather, there were many and decentralized commandos. In Seattle, first the police and later the National
Guard were unable to control the swarming networks. This is how one of the participants in the Seattle protests described activists' actions:

"No centralized leader could have coordinated the scene of chaos, and none was needed-the organic, autonomous organizations were much more powerful and effective. No authority figure could have convinced people to maintain the blockade in the midst of so much tear gas-but empowered people, free to make their own decisions, did precisely that".

Swarming doesn't have to be a physical convergence, such as the urban demonstrations in the recent past. There can be "virtual" swarms, such as the World Campaign against Landmines. Formed almost overnight, this network ushering in "a new form of diplomacy", according to one organizer, and was coordinated by constant communication, allowing national campaigns to exercise vigorous pressure against the United States and other recalcitrant countries.

Due to its effectiveness, swarming might become, in the words of Arquilla and Ronfeldt, the main means of conflict in the information age.

As far as technology is concerned, having sophisticated gadgets can be an important advantage, but it is not the deciding factor. Information can be disseminated through a combination of low and high tech, with old and new methods. Human messengers and face-to-face contacts may still be essential. For example in the battle against ICBG-Maya in Chiapas, indigenous communities were informed of the project and its intentions precisely by the "old ways" of messengers who often traveled on foot from town to town, and also by means of traditional meetings and communal assemblies.

Finally, at the social level, a well-working network depends on the degree to which its members mutually know each other, and how well they are connected. Strong personal links, often based on friendship and shared experiences, can help to assure high levels of trust and loyalty. As a member of the World Campaign against Landmines said, "...trust...is the most important component of political work. When you blow trust, you've blown it all. It's difficult to try and rebuild it."

For a network to be strong and working to perfection, it must be strong at all these levels. And we surmise that it is at these levels that defense strategists are planning to confront networks,
in the short term to limit or detain advances, and to neutralize their effectiveness in the mid-term. We again stress that the urgency for the strategists and the think tanks is to disrupt
networks that today could have an impact on security in the United States, i.e., networks such as Al Qaeda. But later what is achieved in breaking up those networks can and probably will be applied to civilian networks.

One of Arquilla and Ronfeldt's main recommendations to governments is that to break up networks, they must themselves become more like networks. Without necessarily trashing all forms of hierarchical chains of command, the authors recommend that government structures begin to emulate already-existing networks. Specifically for a government this means working in a more coordinated fashion among ministries, departments, areas, bureaus, and offices, establishing networks amongst them, in order to ease the exchange of information and, possibly, to speed the decision-making process, in order to facilitate a rapid response in dynamic moments. The authors
pointedly say with regard to "terrorists" from the "east" that "...the Western world has to begin to build its own network and to learn to swarm the enemy, to keep it on the run or to pin it down
until it can be destroyed".

It should be noted, however, that the authors state that for non-terrorist networks, specifically the activists' networks, governments and corporations should accept them and begin to find
ways of living with them. They say,

"Netwar is not uniformly an adverse phenomenon that has to be, or should be, always confronted. It is not necessarily a mode of conflict that is always opposed to government objectives...states 
could embrace and encourage favorable non-governmental actors, as well as their networks, encouraging their growth, increasing their strength, and working with them in a coordinated way...But the risk of such a strategy is that states could inadvertently help to create a fabric of a new globalized and interconnected society that in the end could be strong enough to constrain states when there is a conflict of interests. It might be an acceptable risk; but it
is a risk that would have to be analyzed very carefully."

In other words, a modern "democratic" state cannot openly prohibit the CSOs and their networks. But the warning is clear: strategies and tactics for their containment must be developed and readied. The task surely had begun before September 11, but the attacks speeded things along. One clear example was, in this the information age, the elevation of "disinformation" (i.e., lies) as a part of official U.S. governmental policy. Doubtlessly strategists are working on the five levels mentioned previously in order to weaken and neutralize networks. They of course wouldn't want those ants commandeering the steam roller.

(1) Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Rand Corporation, United States, 2001.

(2) See, for example, "Nuclear Nightmares", New York Times, May 26, 2002, by Bill Keller.

Miguel Pickard Center for Economic and Political Investigations of Community Action, A.C. CIEPAC is a member of the Movement for Democracy and Life (MDV) of Chiapas, the Mexican Network of Action Against Free Trade (RMALC) www.rmalc.org.mx, Convergence of Movements of the Peoples of the Americas (COMPA ) www.sitiocompa.org, Network for Peace in Chiapas, Week for Biological and Cultural Diversity www.laneta.apc.org/biodiversidad and of the International Forum "The People Before Globalization", Alternatives to the PPP http://usuarios.tripod.es/xelaju/xela.htm.

Note: If you wish to be placed on a list to receive this English version of the Bulletin, or the Spanish, or both, please direct a request to: ciepac@laneta.apc.org and indicate whether you wish to receive the bulletin in plain text or as a Word 7 for Windows 95 attachment.

Note: If you use this information, cite the source and our email address. We are grateful to the persons and institutions who have given us their comments on these Bulletins. CIEPAC, A.C. is a non-government and non-profit organization, and your support is necessary for us to be able to continue offering you this news and analysis service. If you would like to contribute, in any amount, we would infinitely appreciate your remittance to the bank account in the name of:

CIEPAC, A.C. Bank: Banamex Account number: 7049672 Sucursal 386 San Cristbal de las Casas, Chiapas, Mxico. You will also need to use an ABA number: BNMXMXMM

Thank you! CIEPAC

Centro de Investigaciones Econmicas y Polticas de Accin Comunitaria CIEPAC, A.C. Eje Vial Uno, No. 11 Col. Jardines de Vista Hermosa 29297 San Cristbal, Chiapas, MEXICO

Telephone: in Mxico: 01 967 678 5832 from outside Mexico:: +52 967 678 5832