BRIEFING
re: call on Kofi Annan to review the UN's conduct in relation to the
Act of 'Free' Choice in West Papua in 1968-1969
Background
to the United Nations Involvement in West Papua (Irian Jaya)
Until
October 1962, West Papua (Irian Jaya) was a non-self governing
territory that was being prepared for eventual independence by the
Netherlands.
However,
Dutch policy in West Papua was strongly opposed by Indonesia’s
President Sukarno who claimed that, as a former part of the Dutch
East Indies, the territory was Indonesian.
When
diplomatic appeals to the UN General Assembly failed to win him
sufficient support, Sukarno embarked upon a massive arms build up
and threatened to take West Papua by force.
In
September 1961, the Dutch presented a plan (the Luns Plan) to the UN
General Assembly to resolve the dispute peacefully. They proposed to
hand the territory over to a UN administration that would remain
until the population was considered ready to exercise their right to
self-determination. Although it won majority support, it fell short
of the required two-thirds of votes to be passed.
With
no solution agreed at the UNGA, the threat of an Indonesian attack
on the territory grew. To avoid this the US put pressure on
the Dutch to give in to most of Jakarta’s demands and come to some
form of UN-brokered agreement with them.
The
result was the signing on 15 August 1962 of the New York Agreement
between the Netherlands and Indonesia.
In
confidential communications, the Kennedy administration made clear
the motivation behind its coercion of the Dutch. As one senior
official advised the President on the day the Agreement was signed:
we
ought to capitalise on the WNG settlement by moving fast toward the
‘future fruitful cooperation’ of which you spoke to Sukarno.
Capital of the sort we’ve gained is a transitory asset to be used
while it’s still good. Moreover, Indonesia is one of the truly big
areas of East-West competition; having invested so much in
maneuvering a WNG settlement for the express purpose of giving us
leverage in this competition, we’d be foolish not to follow
through. [Komer. Memorandum to President Kennedy, 15 August 1962. In
US Foreign Relations 1961-63, Vol XXIII Southeast Asia, (Department
of State Printing Office, 1994), p. 626 – Enclosure 1]
Main
points of the New York Agreement
Under
the agreement, West Papua was to be handed over to the United
Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) for a minimum of 7
months. But unlike the Dutch plan, the UN was then permitted to
transfer authority to Jakarta before any act of self-determination.
Nonetheless,
the New York Agreement did give the Papuans certain rights.
Under
Article 22, The UN and Indonesia had to guarantee fully the rights,
including the rights of free speech, freedom of movement and of
assembly of the Papuans.
Under
Article 18, all adult Papuans had the right to participate in an act
of self-determination to be carried out in accordance with
international practice.
Under
Article 16, a number of UN experts were to remain in the territory
following the transfer of administrative responsibility to
Indonesia. Their primary task was to advise and assist the
Indonesians in their preparations for Papuan self-determination that
was to take place before the end of 1969.
Under
Article 17, one year prior to self-determination, the
Secretary-General was to appoint a representative who would lead a
team of UN officials including those already stationed in the
territory and additional staff as required. Their task was to
continue and build on the work outlined in Article 16 and remain
until the act of self-determination was complete.
UNTEA
1962-63
Under
the direct control of Under Secretary General Narasimhan, The United
Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) administered West
Papua from 1 October 1962 to 1 May 1963 – the minimum period
stipulated in the agreement. Indonesian military and civilian
personnel were present in growing numbers throughout and there is
much evidence in the UN archives and elsewhere to indicate that
UNTEA’s freedom to administer independently was severely
restricted by Jakarta. As a result, Papuan rights and freedoms
guaranteed under Article 22 suffered. In fact it seems that
the UN’s priority was simply to ensure that the Papuans acquiesced
to whatever fate was decided for them, even if that meant abandoning
the central tenet of the Agreement. As one senior UNTEA official
privately reported:
if
the date is advanced or if the Agreement is changed doing away with
a plebiscite, I do not expect widespread disturbances because we
have sufficient forces to control the situation - a whiff of
grapeshot can easily control the situation if that is what UNTEA
wants. [UN Archives: DAG 13/ 2.1.0.1:3. Report by D. Wilson (UNTEA
Divisional Commissioner Merauke) to Somerville, 8 December 1962 –
Enclosure 2].
Another
senior UNTEA official made clear in his confidential reports that he
was under no illusion as to the real state of affairs in the UN
administered territory:
I
have yet to meet any thinking, sober, generally responsible Papuan
who sees good in the coming link with Indonesia….Unwelcome as the
anxiety and resistance of thinking Papuans maybe it is of course
hardly surprising if one is not under pressure to close one’s eyes
to what is in fact happening to this people at the hands of the
three parties to the Agreement. [UN Archives: DAG 13/2.1.0.1:3.
Report by Rawlings (UNTEA Divisional Commissioner Biak) to
Somerville, 12 December 1962 – Enclosure 3]
Article
16
Following
the transfer of administration to Indonesia, no UN officials were
permitted to remain to fulfill Article 16’s stipulations. As a
consequence, this important part of the Agreement was never
implemented. Because of this, there was no mechanism in place for
the Secretary-General to be kept informed of the on-going situation
in West Papua. This meant that with no international witnesses
present, Indonesia was then able to completely ignore Article 22’s
provisions on human rights and political freedoms. The result of
this state of affairs was commented upon by an American diplomat who
was one of the few foreign officials permitted to enter the
territory in early 1968. Reporting on the Indonesian response to
Papuan resistance he noted:
The
Indonesians have tried everything from bombing them with B.26’s
[sic], to shelling and mortaring them, but a continuous state of
semi-rebellion persists. Brutalities are undoubtedly perpetrated
from time to time in a fruitless attempt at repression. [Report of a
conversation between Reynders, US Embassy, Jakarta, and Ian Morgan,
British Embassy, Jakarta, April 9, 1968. Public Record Office UK.
FCO 15/162. DH1/7 – Enclosure 4]
The Act
of Free Choice
In
August 1968, Fernando Ortiz Sanz arrived in West Papua as the
Secretary General’s representative to advise, assist and
participate in Article 18’s Indonesian-organized act of
self-determination (known as the “Act of Free Choice”). He
originally planned to have at least 50 UN staff on his team but,
following pressure from Jakarta, the total never exceeded 16
(including administrative personnel). As Ortiz Sanz was to mention
in his final report to the UNGA, the failure to implement Article 16
meant that he had no experienced staff ready on the ground to advise
him when he arrived. As a consequence, he had only a few months to
begin the task of gathering information with staff new to the
territory – a job that should have already have been done over the
previous 5 years.
While
the UN had urged Australia as early as 1962 to adopt universal
suffrage in Australian New Guinea (now the independent state of
Papua New Guinea), Ortiz Sanz accepted Jakarta’s argument that the
West Papuans were “too primitive” to cope with a referendum.
Instead he proposed a “mixed method” for the Act of Free Choice,
which would allow direct voting in the towns while other areas would
rely upon some form of “collective consultation”. This, he
privately warned Jakarta represented “the minimum requirement to
satisfy world public opinion.” [UN Archives: Series 100, Box 1,
File 5: Ortiz Sanz to Indonesian Ambassador Sudjarwo Tjondronegoro,
November 21,1968 – Enclosure 5]
Indonesia
rejected this and instead announced that they would use existing
regional councils (which had not been democratically elected) to
decide on behalf of the people. Before the final vote, these
councils were to have additional members selected so that a planned
total of 1025 Papuans would eventually take part in the Act of Free
Choice. With no plebiscite, the selection of these additional
members was the only potential opportunity that the Papuan people
had to have any genuine involvement in the Act of Free Choice.
This
was acknowledged by both Ortiz Sanz and the Secretary-General who
emphasized:
…the
importance of electing the additional councilors in a way that would
ensure that the new councilors would truly represent the people of
their constituencies. This would be the touchstone in the judgment
about the fairness and validity of the whole exercise which would be
made by Member States of the United Nations. [UN Archives: DAG 1/
2.2.3: 9: Rolz-Bennett to Ortiz Sanz (cable No. 250), May 9, 1969
– Enclosure 6]
But
in the end the UN witnessed the selection of only 195 out of the
1022 members who eventually took part in the Act of Free Choice (The
final total was supposed to be 1026 following a last minute
addition. However during the actual Act of Free Choice, 4 did not
participate “due to illness”). Furthermore there is evidence
from witnesses that these selections were made solely by Indonesian
officials with no genuine Papuan participation.
For
example, an Australian journalist, Hugh Lunn reported that the
selection he witnessed consisted of a group of Indonesians walking
into a silent crowd of Papuans and choosing six men that they
themselves had selected. He then described how Indonesian soldiers
arrested three Papuans who displayed placards demanding a
plebiscite. One journalist appealed to Ortiz Sanz to intervene, but
he simply said that he was there just to observe [Hugh Lunn article
in The Australian newspaper, August 21,1999 – Enclosure 7].
Elsewhere, two Papuans (Willem Zonggonao and Clemens Runawery)
attempted to travel to New York to present a Papuan petition calling
for independence but were detained by the Australians after they
crossed over into Australian New Guinea. This was in direct response
to a request by the Indonesians. As Gordon Jockell, Australia’s
Ambassador to Jakarta commented:
immediate
concern of Indonesia is that early arrival of these 2 West Irianese
at UN could stimulate defiance and seriously upset the management of
conduct of Act of Free Choice within West Irian...Malik said he
hoped that we'd keep the 2 refugees on Manus island over next few
weeks as a satisfactory way of dealing with the problem. [Quoted in
television documentary by Mark Worth. "Act of No Choice,"
SBS Television, Dateline programme, broadcast in Australia, 25
August 1999. See The Age, 26 August 1999 - Enclosure 8].
It
is no surprise therefore that when the Act of Free Choice finally
took place, all 1022 members of the 8 Papuan Regional Assemblies
voted unanimously for integration with Indonesia and rejected
independence.
It
was the result desired by all those involved, except the Papuans. As
a US document from as early as 1968 made clear, Ortiz Sanz’s
intention from the beginning was to ensure that West Irian remained
with Indonesia. The only matter of debate was the extent to which
any genuine Papuan opinion would be permitted:
He
is therefore attempting to devise a formula for an “act of free
choice” in West Irian which will result in affirmation of
Indonesian sovereignty but which will also represent a fair
reflection of the people’s desires and will stand the test of
international opinion….Ortiz recognizes that the problem facing
both him and the GOI [Indonesia] is the risk that the Irian
representatives, however they might be constituted, would vote
against remaining in Indonesia. He concedes that it would be
inconceivable from the point of view of the interests of the UN as
well as GOI, that a result other than the continuance of West Irian
within Indonesian sovereignty should emerge. [US Archives (NARA) Pol
19 West Irian: 4 October 1968, US Embassy to Dept of State
Washington – Enclosure 9]
Despite
the fundamental flaws in the whole process, international reaction
was comparatively muted. As one British diplomat in New York
reported to London:
Our
strong impression is that the great majority of United Nations
members want to see this question cleared out of the way with the
minimum of fuss as soon as possible…the Secretariat, whose
influence could be important, appear only too anxious to get shot of
the problem as quickly and smoothly as possible [A. D. Parsons, UK
Mission to the UN, to D. F. B. Le Breton, July 17, 1969. PRO: FCO
24/449, (FWD 1/4) – Enclosure 10].
The
lack of international interest in a genuine implementation of Papuan
self-determination was also referred to by another British diplomat
even before Ortiz Sanz’s arrival in the territory:
The
strength of the Indonesian position lies in the fact that ... they
must know that, even if there are protests about the way they go
through the motions of consultation, no other power is likely to
conceive it as being in their interests to intervene. . . . I
understand that the exiles may find support in the Australian press.
But I cannot imagine the US, Japanese, Dutch, or Australian
Governments putting at risk their economic and political relations
with Indonesia on a matter of principle involving a relatively small
number of very primitive people. [J. M. Sutherland to D. Murray,
'Foreign Office South-East Asia Department, April 30, 1968. PRO: FCO
15/162 DH1/7 – Enclosure 11]
Ortiz
Sanz’s report to the UNGA concluded only that an act of
self-determination had taken place in accordance with “Indonesian
practice” – A clear breach of Article 18 of the Agreement which
specified “International Practice”.
Furthermore
Ortiz Sanz’s UNGA report explicitly mentions that Article 22 was
not “fully implemented and the Administration exercised at all
times a tight political control over the population” [para 251].
Despite
an unsuccessful attempt by some African countries, led by Ghana, to
give the Papuans a further opportunity to vote again on the issue,
the UNGA voted on 19 November 1969 to “take note of the result”,
and with that West Papua effectively disappeared from the UN’s
agenda.
To
conclude, there is overwhelming evidence to show that the West
Papuans did not have the opportunity to exercise their right to
self-determination as guaranteed in the New York Agreement and under
UNGA Resolution 1514 on the granting of independence to colonial
peoples (14 December 1960). This view was expressed privately at the
time by members of Ortiz Sanz’s own team and the British Foreign
Office noted:
Privately,
however, we recognise that the people of West Irian have no desire
to be ruled by the Indonesians who are of an alien (Javanese) race,
and that the process of consultation did not allow a genuinely free
choice to be made. [PRO: FCO 24/449 (FWD1/4). FCO briefing on West
Irian prepared for the UK delegation to the UNGA, 10 September 1969
– Enclosure 12]
But
more importantly CV Narasimhan, the retired UN Under
Secretary-General who was central to the UN’s involvement in
1960’s West Papua, has now publicly spoken out on the Act of Free
Choice. In an interview with the AP journalist Slobodan Lekic he
confessed:
It
was just a whitewash. The mood at the United nations was to get rid
of this problem as quickly as possible…Nobody gave a thought to
the fact that there were a million people there who had their
fundamental human rights trampled…How could anyone have seriously
believed that all voters unanimously decided to join his [Suharto’s]
regime?…Unanimity like that is unknown in democracies. [Published
in an article by Lekic in the Sydney Morning Herald, 23/11/01
“Historic Vote was a Sham: Ex-UN Chiefs Admit” – Enclosure
13].
With
such serious allegations from the key UN figure involved, supported
by overwhelming evidence from newly de-classified UN and other
documents, there is a very strong case for the United Nations to
look again at this episode from its past. Otherwise this issue will
continue to damage the UN’s reputation as a defender of political
and human rights. In the Netherlands, the Dutch Foreign Minister has
already ordered a similar exercise and results are due out in the
next year or so.
The
UN has already carried out re-examinations of other UN operations
– a major example being Rwanda. There is also a UN “Lessons
Learned Unit” in place to investigate past events.
Furthermore,
the consequences of the 1969 Act of Free Choice are still very much
relevant to the people of West Papua today. Since the UN’s
withdrawal, the West Papuans have been subjected to widespread
political and human rights violations and many thousands have been
killed. But in June 2000, the easing of political repression in
Indonesia offered the Papuans the chance to hold a peaceful Congress
made up of Papuans from all walks of life.
They
elected Theys Eluay as Chairman of the Papuan Presidium and as one
of their central pronouncements, called for a review to be held of
the 1969 Act of Free Choice which they rejected as illegitimate
because it was not a genuine act of self-determination. A year and a
half on, Theys Eluay has been murdered and the political openness of
the past few years has gone. Nonetheless the Australian-based
Professor of International Law, Professor Sam Blay is currently
carrying out a re-examination on behalf of the Presidium.
Furthermore, a book on the subject by Dr. John Saltford (based upon
his Ph.D thesis) is due out next year.
It
is surely in the best interests of the West Papuans, the UN and even
the Indonesians, that the full facts surrounding the Act of Free
Choice be revealed. There is nothing to be gained from maintaining a
distorted version of history that can only further distort current
efforts to solve the West Papuan issue peacefully. It is far better
that the UN itself addresses this task rather than remain silent and
leave it to others.
[JFS
Jan 2002]
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