Modus Operandi: Similarities with Previous Military Operations in West Papua

by CEB of WPNews, 06 May 2003

In relation to the current military operations across the highlands, it is important to note similarities among the operations so far in order to help us understand who is actually causing problems in West Papua.

1)      The TNI declares emergency situation in West Papua highlands and deploys thousands of extra troops into West Papua. This is exactly what happened in Timika (2002), Numbay (2000 and 2001), West Papua – PNG border areas (2002-2003) and now in Wamena. When attack happened in these areas, TNI/Polri commanders urgently declare the territories in emergency situation for military operations. 

2)      Assault rifles were used (this category of weapon is beyond the usual access of the TPN/OPM). These British and US made rifles and bullets are beyond the reach of any TPN/OPM fighters and exclusively used by the TNI Special Forces (Kopassus). In Timika (2002 where two American teachers were killed) and at the border areas, these bullets were shown as the proofs, even though everyone in West Papua and Indonesia knows that these bullets are not on sale all over Indonesia.

3)      Such incidents happen when the Indonesian president announces to make a visit to West Papua or leading to important meetings to be held in West Papua.

a.      On September 7, 2002, there was a meeting planned for the North Pacific Nations Meeting to be held in Timika, and the incident happened just some days before that.[i]

b.      On 24 December, President Megawati Sukarnoputri was planning to visit West Papua in Christmas Celebration, and the ambush along the border between PNG-West Papua happened on 18 December 2002.

c.      The Joint Border Liaison Meeting was planned to be held in Vanimo, PNG and Port Numbay, West Papua early January 2003, and another ambush occurred, when the Indonesian Ambassador to PNG was passing the border some days before the meeting.

d.      Recently, Indonesian President just announced her plan to visit Mulia, central highlands of West Papua and this incident in Wamena happened some days before her visit.

4)      Conveniently, Papuan ID cards were left behind. This also happened in all other incidents in West Papua. Why should the TPN/OPM fighters conveniently leave the ID cards? Or why should they carry their IDs when they know they are attacking the TNI/Police?

The OPM have immediately been blamed in this case.  In the attack on the Wamena armoury, it appears that jackets were left by attackers and according to one report ID cards were also left, along with medicines, machetes, and spent M16 shells.

5)      Charges based on ID Cards have been similar in most of the incidents. After the Bloody Abepura incident (7 December 2000), they found out the Passport of the Secretary-General of the Koteka Tribal Assembly (Demmak). They arrested him and brought him to trial just for holding a PNG passport. Similarly, in Wamena incident this year, they found an ID card of Alpius Murib, current coordinator of Demmak for West Papua. How can these Demmak leaders leave their ID cards when attacks were “suspected” to be carried out by TPN/OPM members? This is clearly to claim that Demmak is directly linked to the TPN/OPM command and therefore Demmak should be outlawed.

6)      Just as in the TNI assault on Freeport employees, as well as the one at the border areas, a Papuan body was also found. This “dead” body scenario has been used to justify that Papuans were the attackers, not the TNI/Polri of Indonesia.

7)      A senior TPN/OPM commander in the area and its Supreme Commander Gen TPN PB Mathias Wenda has denied involvement. They also denied their involvements in previous attacks mentioned above. While, the military commanders in Jakarta do not rule out possibilities of TNI/Polri members’ involvement in all incidents.

8)      Similarities of TNI commanders’ statements leading to and soon after every incident. Some weeks leading to such incidents and some minutes afterwards, the TNI commanders repeatedly say, “Look, there is a need for more troops in West Papua or Acheh.” In other words, political solution is not enough, and therefore, TNI personnel are still required.

In West Papua cases, the TNI Kopassus troops were withdrawn officially from West Papua, but at the same time they warned, “If there is trouble here, we are coming back soon.”[ii] And in responding to the incident in Wamena (04 April 2003), the same commander reacted, as they did in previous incidents, “Look, we left them only some days, and now they went wild again. Unfortunately, we must destroy them from this planet and we must go back.” Right now thousands of TNI/ Kopassus troops are redeployed to West Papua: in Timika, Manokwari, Border Areas and across the highlands of West Papua
 

9)      Similarities of reaction from the Indonesian Militia Groups. As soon as the incidents happen, the East Timor style militia known as the Red-and-White Task Force (Satgas Merah-Putih) wage their campaigns in convoys across villages and towns, waving the Indonesian Red-and-White-Flag and declaring war and revenge to kill anyone who speaks out against Indonesia.

This kind of action happened many times in the capital Port Numbay as well as along the border areas, Wamena, Timika, Sorong, Manokwari, Fak-Fak

10)   In all incidents, even though there have been indications that the high-ranking military officials in Jakarta are involved in the above mentioned incidents, including those in East Timor, Acheh, Moluccas, Java Island, and the Bali Bombing:

a.      there has been no official acknowledgement of their involvement.

b.      there have been no high-ranking officials brought to justice or punished, let alone questioned for their involvement in various acts of murders across the country.

c.      to avoid the commanders being accused, they normally make up the story as quickly as possible by pointing out or questioning low-ranking TNI members as suspects.

d.      in all incidents, only low-ranking officials have been named as those who “acted out of order” or “improper conducts”. However, most of them have not been punished for their acts. (For East Timor less than 3 people were sentenced for light imprisonments, while key generals were freed. For the case on Theys Eluay’s assassination, only 6 TNI/Kopassus low ranking officials were given light sentences, and none of Generals who gave orders to kill Theys were touched by the laws.  No single TNI/ Kopassus member was punished for killing two American teachers in Timika as it became apparent from credible Australian intelligence sources that Gen. Edriartono Sutartor (Supreme Commander of TNI) had a phone conversation with Timika army commander to carry out the attack.

e.      in West Papua cases, mostly TNI members from Papuan tribes are questioned, tortured, and imposed administrative punishments from the TNI officials, a pure discriminative action.

f.       for Wamena incident, there are some TNI members from Lani (Koteka) tribes being questioned, tortured and most probably will die. Nine TNI members were announced for their involvement in the attack, all of them are from Koteka Tribes people.

11)   They knew but they ignored of the planned incidents. Why? The Police Commander in Chief Gen. Pol Da’i Bachtiar acknowledged on the day of the attack that his office knew of the “planned attack” on Wamena armoury.[iii]

a.      The police also acknowledged that they knew attacks in Timika on 30 August 2002. Similarly, the army also acknowledged their knowledge of a plan to attack PNG-West Papua border areas.

b.      If they knew there was a plan, then why didn’t they prevent it from happening?

c.      Why didn’t they tell the each other?

d.     Aren’t they defend and work for the same state?

12)  Similarities in “immediate reaction blaming TPN/OPM. The Indonesian military have been shown to be involved in the killing of Papuan leader Theys Eluay in November 2001, and in the ambush and killing of Freeport teachers in August 2002, though this had immediately been blamed on the OPM (Free Papua Movement). TNI also blamed the TPN/OPM for attacks at the border on Dec 02-Jan 03, even though they occurred very close to military checkpoints.

13)   During the execution of the attack (1 hour), the electricity of Wamena town was turned off. It was turned on after the “attackers” completed their activities.

a.      No one is questioning “why” the Indonesians who were on duty at the “PLN” (national electric company) centre in Wamena allowed that to happen?

b.      No one is asking, “Who was on duty at the PLN Wamena office at that time?”

c.      No explanation has been given as to why it was turned off just at the same time as the attack happened.

14)   The Indonesian officials have generally referred to those responsible for acts of terror in West Papua as “unknown gangs” and “mysterious gangs”. If it became known that the Indonesian security forces carried out the acts, the high ranking officials in Jakarta will refer to as “an act out of order”, “inappropriate act”, “disproportionate conduct”, or “act against order.”

15)   Medical doctors who carried out autopsy on the corpses are strictly forbidden to explain the truth.

a.      No explanation was given on the dead body found in Timika, on the attack at the border areas.

b.      Only limited explanation was provided during investigation on the assassination of Theys Eluay.

c.      There has been no medical explanation over the death of a Papuan during the attack and Yapenas Murib some days later.

d.      Just like they said about the death of Theys Eluay, the military commanders explained that they died due to the shortage of air in their breathing system. No explanation has been given as to what caused “the air shortage?”

16)   There has been no clear apology or clarification of the TNI commanders over their misjudgments after it becomes clear that TNI members were actively involved in the planning and execution of these ambushes / attacks.

a.      They tend to terrorise / intimidate human rights defenders / organisations for carrying out such investigations and blame them as part of the independence movement. In fact all that speak for human rights in West Papua are regarded part of the campaigns for West Papua Independence, as clearly stated in the Adil Matoa Operation 2002.[iv]

b.      In the Timika case (where two American teachers were killed), the Washing Post reported direct military commanders involvement. Outcome of investigations from the FBI, ELSHAM Papua and Papua Police strongly indicate military involvement. Only the outcome of the TNI denies their involvement.

c.      The cases along the border areas also investigated by ELSHAM and TNI. Both present contradictory outcome. ELSHAM’s investigation shows direct military link, but the TNI has denied.