Five Theories behind the Incident

 by CEB WPNews, 05 Arpil 2003

1 TNI/Kopassus infiltration for justification of Kopassus re-deployment to West Papua.

The Indonesian military is loosing power in the whole Indonesia since the reformation era began in 1998, and they are sending messages to the politicians through these incidents that their role is still needed and fundamental if they want to maintain all islands of Indonesia remain with Indonesia. A recent military “white paper” (09 April 2003)[i] to Jakarta politicians says that TNI should play significant roles in security, defense and politics. Human rights activists in Indonesia raised concerns that this path will bring military back to politics.

Thus, when any incidents happen in Indonesia, military generals already have something to present to the politicians to justify that military roles in security, defense and politics with arguments that they are still and urgently required. In other words, the commanders are claiming that their troops cannot go to their barracks.

This event only happened after days/ weeks of TNI/Kopassus withdrawal from West Papua due to foreign diplomatic pressures. However, the Kopassus needs an incident to justify its re-deployment.

The brain behind the Kopassus infiltration into the attack expected that the local community will react and then the TNI military were ready to launch massive military operations across the highlands of West Papua. This scenario failed as all of Koteka tribes people were still committed to their peaceful solution of the problems.

2  Polri/ NKRI scenario that allowed the planning and execution of the plan to go ahead, to justify deployment of organic and non-organic troops across the highlands of West Papua, with main objective to secure the implementation of Special Autonomy Law and Partition of the Province to go as smoothly as it can.

Two weeks before Wamena attack, the TNI Supreme Commander announced 1,000 troops to be deployed to West Papua to secure the implementation of Special Autonomy and Division of the Papua Province into three. This plan was strongly rejected by the Papuans as well as the Provincial Parliament.

Papuans have refused this plan. In reaction to the refusal, military commanders have been pressurising politicians in Jakarta that West Papua is unsafe for development activities. The security-approach to justify development as the “doctrine” of the Indonesian military has not yet changed as well as the doctrine of TNI’s double-function (in politics and defense).

Concerns have been raised in Jakarta over Papuans’ refusal of Special Autonomy, Partition of the province into three provinces as well as the plan for re-deployment of TNI to West Papua.

This scenario might be also related to the Adil Matoa Operation 2002[ii], launched in order to secure the implementation of the Special Autonomy. The Adil Matoa Operation 2002 outlines key questions, issues and steps to be taken in tackling the peoples’ freedom of expression, with emphasis on mass organisations. Demmak (Koteka Tribal Assembly) was number one in the list to be outlawed. This incident in the area of Demmak shows similarities between other incidents in other Demmak’s areas in Timika, Puncak Jaya and across the border of West Papua – PNG. Such incidents are suspected to be designed to blame and outlaw Demmak and its allies.

The Adil Matoa Operation 2002 has been designed with the goal to secure the implementation of the Special Autonomy Law. Organisations that against the law and the decree for the partition of the province, and organisations that speak against human rights violations in West Papua have been listed as the enemies of the NKRI that should be crashed down.

3 Local NKRI politicians in their power struggle, particularly to become the next Regent of Wamena (Jayawijaya) regency. [iii]

There was also appeared a possible indication that local politicians, either current Regent of Wamena, David Hubi and his deputy, Budiman Kogoya set up the scenario in their power struggle to become the Regent for the next term (after September 2003). In many occasions, David Hubi has been guarded by the TNI/ Kopassus as he is also the Coordinator of the Red-and-White Militia Group in West Papua for Wamena region. He then became worried and created this incident in order to bring back the Kopassus, as they are his guards, trainers of his militia groups and funding organisation of the militia groups.

Particularly during the implementation of the Special autonomy law, Kopassus is needed to secure him, his militia groups and the autonomy projects. He is suspected to generate the incident to justify the redeployment of Kopassus, if not for all Papua, then for Wamena regency.

Whereas Budiman Kogoya has a strong link with the Indonesian Mobile Brigade Police (Brimob) in his daily political activities. He also has support from the people but not from Kopassus as he regards Kopassus troops are in West Papua to kill and cause problems.

The indication became apparent when the two politicians held a series of meetings with tribal elders in the region in search for the “stolen” guns and ammunitions. Budiman Kogoya emphasised the Polri (Brimob) to carry out the operations, while David Hubi telephoned the Governor of Papua and military officials to quickly re-deploy Kopassus and other TNI troops into West Papua.

4 Part of the independence campaign activities by the Liberation Army of Free Papua Movement (TPN/OPM)

The Indonesian army and police officials blamed the TPN/OPM as the suspect of the attack. They suggested that this incident was part of the TPN/OPM campaigns to draw attention of the world to the movement in West Papua. This was the only reason for launching military operations along the Demmak’s areas, killing two civilians and torturing many others, including the TNI members who are from Koteka Tribes.

This theory is weak for four major reasons:

·        Papuan people and organisations, including TPN/OPM and Demmak have declared the area as a Zone of Peace since 2002. Despite the International support on this declaration, only the TNI/Polri that refused this by arguing that West Papua is not a Zone of Peace, but a separatist region that should be handled by security approach, and “peace” approach.

·        The Supreme Commander of TPN/OPM denied his organisations’ involvement, while at the same time the commanders of the TNI did not rule out the possibility of the TNI members’ involvement in the incident. They did not even rule out in the first day of the incident, while TPN/OPM commander denied his involvement in the first day.

·        Investigators of the attack announced on 22 April 2003 that nine members of the TNI were involved in the attack.

·       WPNews interview with TPN/OPM commander, Gen. TPN PB Mathias Wenda shows that there is no policy under his command to attack such places and also his troops have no access to the knowledge of where armoury is located.[iv]

5  One of the activities of the Red-and-White Task Force in Wamena to show the importance and need of its existence in the area.

This theory arose when the commanders of the militia group in Wamena, Haji Asso and Haji Yalipele went on convoy in Wamena town, shouting and declaring war against anyone against Indonesia.

Further indications are as follows:

·        Some hours later, they declared war against the “attackers” of the armoury and promised the NKRI that they will sort out the “attackers” within days.

·        Only three days later, they found most of the guns and ammunitions and returned them back to the TNI commanders in operation in Wamena. How can they find these in such a short time? Wamena is surrounded by mountains and forests, logically not easy for anyone to find the guns and ammunitions in three days only.