Abstract
This study examines the drafting and implementing of special
autonomy laws for Aceh and Papua as part of the Indonesian
government's broader response to secessionist challenges in
both provinces. The background to the political decision to
grant special autonomy to Aceh and Papua is examined while
also presenting a detailed examination of each law. The
objective of this analysis is to provide a case study for
policymakers and academics seeking to understand the
dynamics of separatism. The analysis seeks appropriate
policy responses to the challenge of secessionist movements
and outlines the conditions under which granting autonomy
may or may not be conducive to addressing separatist
conflict.
As this study illustrates, special autonomy laws were
drafted in Indonesia as a response to rapidly growing
independence movements in Aceh and Papua that followed the
collapse of the authoritarian regime of President Suharto in
1998. Responding to mounting violence, the government
offered special autonomy laws in a bid to divert
secessionist demands. This offer of "asymmetric" autonomy in
fact contained significant and special concessions for Aceh
and Papua. Special autonomy was the product of an opportune
moment of Indonesia's democratic transition in which the
government faced multiple crises and central authority was
at a weak point. With pro-independence movements
intensifying their pressure on Jakarta, the government was
impelled to make major concessions as a way of staving off
crisis and keeping the country together.
It was not long, however, before the government was able
to close down the political space for independence leaders
and their supporters, and address other crises challenging
the state. As the government reconstituted central
authority, the imperatives that had driven the decision to
grant special autonomy eased. And as the government's
commitment to special autonomy faltered, it soon turned to
more coercive measures to respond to separatist demands. By
2003, the government was pursuing an alternative strategy of
imposing martial law in Aceh and subdividing Papua, a
strategy that eclipsed special autonomy and signaled a
return to a more coercive, less accommodating, posture.
In presenting the case study of Aceh and Papua, this
essay confirms a central theme of the comparative literature
on autonomy: the fragility of such arrangements and their
vulnerability to reversal. Special autonomy arrangements are
exceedingly difficult to entrench as national elites almost
always resist demands to devolve political authority and are
suspicious of any initiative that may set a precedent for
other regions. This is particularly the case in large
multiethnic countries such as Indonesia where the state
faces an array of possible challenges to its authority. A
driving force in the Indonesian government's backsliding,
for instance, was the official concern that special autonomy
was fuelling separatism rather than resolving it. In
conceding special rights to Papua and Aceh, officials feared
a cascade of similar demands from other regions.
All of this suggests that special autonomy, in and of
itself, does not represent a solution to separatist
conflict. Rather, the concessions that are offered under
special autonomy must be part of a broad process of
bargaining and negotiation. In the absence of official
negotiation with popular elements, autonomy arrangements
typically fail to generate widespread support. In this
context, central governments, which have many incentives to
roll back autonomy, incur few costs in doing so. As this
study illustrates, the provincial elites and national
parliamentarians that formulated and enacted special
autonomy in Indonesia did so largely in isolation from
popular elements in both provinces. Special autonomy
represented a unilateral concession on the part of Jakarta
that lacked any links to the main political forces
advocating independence in either province. What has been
missing to date is a systematic bargaining process between
Jakarta and the regions—one that links concessions granted
under the laws with a wide-ranging dialogue involving key
elements of Papuan and Acehnese society.
This study concludes by examining these comparative
themes while also discussing the future prospects for
special autonomy in Indonesia. Neither ad hoc unilateral
concession making nor the subsequent shift to coercive
measures has resolved separatist conflict in Aceh or Papua.
In fact, the adoption of more coercive means has not only
failed to address the underlying causes of injustice driving
both conflicts but has actually exacerbated the alienation
of local populations from the state.
As a result, the government may again turn to special
autonomy as a means to address separatism. The laws remain
in place and revenues from autonomy continue to be
allocated. But even if Jakarta does strike a more committed
posture toward special autonomy, the government will need to
move beyond the ad hoc policy responses of the past. At a
bare minimum, a link must be established between, on the one
hand, the unilateral concessions offered under the laws and,
on the other, a systematic bargaining process between
Jakarta and the regions to build support for resolving the
conflicts. Without linking concessions to dialogue, Aceh and
Papua are likely to represent a continuing source of
conflict and secessionism for the Indonesian state.
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