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THE FACE OF AUTONOMY PACKAGE FOR INDONESIA'S WEST PAPUA: Its Threats to Pluralism and Development  according to Papuans' Experience...

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PENDEKATAN KEKERASAN DAN ANTI KEKERASAN DALAM PERJUANGAN PAPUA MERDEKA: MENGUJI KEBENARAN MUTLAK (VIOLENT AND NON-VIOLENT ACTIONS IN THE WEST PAPUA INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT: TO TEST THE ABSOLUTE TRUTH) by Joseph Baweng (Muyu Tribesman of Maroke Region) - English version by the CEB, March 2001.

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HARGA DIRI  DIKORBANKAN UNTUK KEPENTINGAN DUNIA (Refleksi perjalanan orang kulit hitam dalam membangun dunia.): By Joseph Baweng - English version by the CEB, March 2001.

4 PASAL MAKAR: SUATU STRATEGI MENGHUKUM RASIONALITAS ORANG PAPUA? Oleh Joseph
4 Revolutions and movements mostly hijacked by well-organised bodies to turn the issues into their agendas, by Mr. X to Mr. X
4 In Focus: Papua: Another East Timor? (West Papua politics)
 

 THE FACE OF AUTONOMY PACKAGE FOR INDONESIA’S WEST PAPUA: 

Its Threats to Pluralism and Development
according to Papuans’ Experience[1]

(Does Autonomy Package help pluralism & development in Indonesia’s West Papua?)

The Late Ondofolo Dortheys Hiyo Eluay[2]

 

An Intervention

Presented to the Seminar on Minority Rights:

Cultural Diversity and Development in Southeast Asia,

The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

(Chiang Mai, Thailand, 4 to 7 December 2002)

 

By

Sem Karoba[3]

Koteka Tribal Assembly for Rights, Justice and Peace in West Papua,  INDONESIA


 

1    Abstract

The topic of this seminar, Cultural Diversity and Development in Southeast Asia reflects the view that there are ways for communities with diverse cultural backgrounds to live as a society (within a state or a national group). It shows that persons belonging to minorities (or the minorities) have the right to development. That is the theory, or what we expect to hear in this seminar.

 

I would like to present the true face of autonomy packages (i.e., development programmes as Indonesia argues) in West Papua based on personal experience and observations. That is to say, the practice of this very theory. “Is the autonomy package for Indonesia’s West Papua a development policy for humanity or just a political manipulation of the truth? Or does Autonomy Package help pluralism & development in Indonesia’s West Papua?”

Theoretically, Indonesia today has the best Bills ever, since its independence to handle various problems in the country, including the issue of minority rights and their involvement or participation in development policies. However, these bills are in fact counter productive because the new bills are giving more rights to certain regions and peoples than the others and also due to incapability of government bureaucracies and officers as well as systems of governance and bureaucracies in place in fact block the proper implementation these policies.

 

Frankly speaking, I personally have not yet experienced or seen a single example practices that development programmes in Indonesia’s West Papua within “autonomy” promotes cultural diversity (pluralism) and development.[4] What I know is that it brings about, unfortunately, the reversed outcomes, i.e., threats to pluralism and not development, but rather destruction to social and natural environments. For example, more privileges were given to non-Papuans in the past autonomy packages, but within the current special autonomy, Papuans are given more privileges. Thus, it is not solving the problems, but reversing the problems from one direction to the other or re-generating new problems to the unsolved problems.

 

What I know from my experience is that the special autonomy for West Papua is not more than further violation of human rights, as well as violation of democratic principles that sacrificed law and order that threatens development and pluralism in West Papua as guaranteed in the UN Declarations on Minorities.

 

2    Faces of Special Autonomy in West Papua

 

2.1 Background

I am Sem Karoba, spokesperson for international community of the Alliance of Papuan Students for the Koteka Tribal Assembly and the West Papuan Community. I am representing tribal people of West Papua who are now under continuous threats of arbitrary arrest and detention, torture, rape, kidnapping and murders, speaking for the people who have lost their rights to live as human beings on our own ancestral lands.

 

West Papua is the western half of New Guinea Island, which was previously known as the Netherlands Niuew Guinea (1800s-1963), West Irian (1963-1974), and Irian Jaya (1974-2001). The territory is three times Java Island with only about 2 million indigenous minorities inhabiting it.  The eastern half was called the British New Guinea and then it is now known as Papua and New Guinea (PNG).

 

West Papua as a state and a people was annexed (or re-colonised) by Indonesia in 1963-1969 after the most disputed and fraudulent  “Act of ‘Free’ Choice” in which Indonesian-appointed ‘representatives’ voted in favour of Indonesia whereas Papuan nationalists were banned to vote and even threatened to death.[5]

 

Gross violations of human rights began right during the Act of Free Choice and still continue today. At least 300,000 Papuans lost their lives so far. Many are under continuous threats of terror, intimidation, arbitrary arrest and detention. Tens of thousands of acres of lands were taken away for mining operations, deforestation, transmigration and construction of buildings, roads and other facilities. Indonesia claims these all for “development of West Papuan people.”

 

Only after the resignation of dictator Suharto in 1998, there was space for Papuans to freely express their opinions, including the aspiration for self-determination. Indonesia responded to the demand with the offer of Special Autonomy.

 

2.2 Brief History on Autonomy for West Papua

The Netherlands New Guinea/ West Irian was under the first “autonomy” status since1 May 1963-30 April 1988, implemented based on the Secret Memorandum of Rome of 30 September 1962.[6]

 

The second autonomy package for West Papua was imposed in 1974, after the name West New Guinea/ West Irian was changed into “Irian Jaya”.[7] At the same time, the territory was declared as the Military Operation Zone (DOM – Daerah Operasi MIliter) along with Aceh and East Timor.

 

After Indonesian dictator, Suharto stepped down (1998); the aspiration for independence was aired throughout West Papua and other parts of Indonesia. East Timor was given options to vote for independence or autonomy within Indonesia. Other parts of Indonesia, particularly West Papua was not given the same offer, but now forced to accept whatever Jakarta decides.

 

Special autonomy was given to two provinces in Indonesia: Acheh and West Papua (Autonomy Bill for West Papua No.21 of 21 November 2001a. While regional autonomy was offered to other provinces (according to the Bill of Regional Autonomy No. 22 of 1999). Below is the “Speciality” of this autonomy package.

 

2.3 Face of Democracy in this ‘Special’ Autonomy

According to the UN Declaration on Democracy[8] the fundamental function of the States is to guarantee the civil, cultural, economic, political, and social rights. Democracy goes hand in hand with an effective government, honest and transparent, freely chosen and responsible for public governance. The fact in West Papua is that even the rights to live as human beings as stated in Articles 1 and 6 of the UN Bill of Rights is under serious threat. How can Papuans demand for promotion and protection of other rights when the fundamental right to live as human beings is under serious threat?

 

Those who express their opinions are under continuous intimidation and terror. One of the free expressions of Papuan people is that they neither accepted nor refused special autonomy package launched in January 2002. Indonesia wants Papuans to accept the offer with no compromise. A policy can only be regarded democratic when the stages of inputting, processing, and output involve people of the respective community or territory. Representatives of Papuan people were, in fact excluded during the inputting and processing of the Special Autonomy Bill even though the policy has considerable impacts to the livelihood and survival of indigenous Papuans. What actually happened was what the late Theys Eluay called as “Government to government consultation” only. The government does not appear to be interested in democracy as their attitudes and actions in West Papua are fundamentally anti-democratic. i.e., violations of Article 2 points (3) and (4) of the UNGA Resolution on Minorities.[9] A classic argument used has been that it is the best policy for preserving national sovereignty, integrity and unity, and for regional development. 

 

Protests by the indigenous minorities have been neglected. Jakarta regards Papuans do not know what they are talking about as we are just cannibals, primitives, stone aged people and uncivilised and their voice was regarded as “rebellion” against the modern state and its policies. Tribal councils (assemblies) were outlawed and banned to speak for the tribes they represent, including the Koteka Tribal Assembly. [10]  The stigma of Liberation Army of Free Papua Movement (TPN/OPM) is normally used to ban the tribal organisations. Plus, the use of local languages as well as the use or practice of traditional identities and symbols has been banned, violating Article s1 point (1), and 2 points (1) and (4).[11]

 

Thus, interests of the indigenous minorities in West Papua are totally neglected, violating Articles 5 and 6 the UN Declaration on Minorities.

 

Furthermore, the organs and systems for democratic governance in West Papua are not in place. The only democratic element of the “autonomy bill” is the chance to establish the Papua People’s Council (MRP), which, in theory, considers the voices of tribal elders, religious leaders, and other elements of the community. However, the Indonesian government is now active in selecting and appointing tribal elders, leaders of youth and women, and paying religious leaders so that members of the MRP are essentially government agents. The State does not adopt appropriate legislative and other measures to achieve what its objectives.[12] While banning the existing tribal councils, the manipulation of the peoples’ organisations as happened during the 1969[13] is underway. Papuans are in trauma; they do not want to repeat the past mistake. However, Indonesia wants Papuans to blindly accept whatever Jakarta decides: - a clear violation of international standards and principles of democracy and human rights.

 

2.4 Face of Human Rights in this ‘Special Autonomy’

 

2.4.1 Facts of Human Rights Abuses

Murdering of Papuan leaders is the modus operandi in forcing this special autonomy. The kidnapping and assassination of the late Ondofolo (Tribal Elder of Sentani Tribe) and Chair of PDP and Chair  LAM[14], Dortheys Hiyo Eluay on 10-11 November 2001 is the climax of and the best example of gross violations of human rights in West Papua. He was kidnapped after attending a reception night in celebrating Indonesian hero day (10 November) held by the Indonesian Special Forces (Kopassus) and found dead a day later in his car. Local NGOs, national NGOs and the Indonesian military, police as well as the government launched different teams of investigations to uncover the mystery. And yet, all failed to do their best. Impunity for the government apparatuses is the problem when the justification for integrity of Indonesia defeats the rights of human beings to live.

 

Yafeth Yelemaken tribal elder from Wamena region (Lani/ Koteka Tribe) was poisoned to death on 22 June 2002. Simon Alom and William Onde, both independent campaigners were found death after being shot by Indonesian military in 2001. Students were chased into their dormitories and beaten up to death aftermath of the so-called “Bloody Abepura” that cost many lives. Another incident was fuelled by the local police commander (6 October 2000) and killed more than 30 innocent civilians in what is now called “Bloody Wamena”.

 

Furthermore, since the launch of Operasi Adil Matoa 2002, Benny Wenda (Secretary-General of the Koteka Tribal Assembly – Demmak) was arbitrarily arrested and detained on 8 June 2002. After unjust trials in September 2002, he then disappeared from Abepura prison on 26 September 2002 without trace, suspected kidnapped by “unknown gangs”, as the Indonesian authorities normally call them. Still no one has claimed responsible for it, no one has been brought to justice even though all fingers point towards Kopassus. In addition, provincial police declared a shoot to kill policy should they find Benny Wenda, an elder who speaks out for the rights of indigenous minorities, peace and justice in West Papua.

 

Another outcome of the Adil Matoa Operation 2002 was the ambush on 31 August 2002, again by “unknown gangs” when two Americans, one Indonesian and one Papuan were killed. The findings of Four FBI agents’ and that of the Indonesian officials’ are contradictory. Papuan human rights organisations and FBI findings indicate Indonesian general’s involvement in the ambush, but the Indonesian authorities blame the Liberation Army of Free Papua Movement (TPN/OPM) for it. TPN/OPM commanders denied their involvement in this inhuman ambush. They claim there are no other mysterious killers in West Papua except “unknown gangs” or the Kopassus or its militia troops.[15]

 

In addition to these, clandestine operations, intimidation and acts of state terror have been underway in cooperation with the various militia gangs such as the Red-and-White Task Force, Jihad Troops, the Indonesian Special Forces (Kopassus), and other task forces. Their operations have been intensified leading up to and during the implementation of the Autonomy Package. The commander in chief of the Red-and-White Task Force[16] (East Timor style militia group), who is now the Indonesian ambassador to PNG, has ordered a clean-up and intimidation operation throughout West Papua and Indonesia. His militia groups, along with the Indonesian military and police, are now active in terrorising the people, chasing, arbitrarily arresting and imprisoning anyone they suspect of dissent. Students are regularly chased into their dormitories, arrested, disappeared and some found dead. The scale of military and militia activity fluctuates but the atmosphere of tension remains high at all times.[17]

 

Human rights NGOs and activists, including myself, receive continuous threats. I cannot even visit my village and family. I cannot freely teach at the college. I cannot walk freely as other human beings. I am under the black list of Indonesia just for speaking out for the rights of my tribal people. My colleagues continuously receive phone threats and some are caught, tortured and threatened with death penalty. Also mass organisations such as Demmak and AMP[18] are outlawed. As I said in my book on Theys Eluay’s assassination, “The Indonesian authorities are committing acts of murder against democracy, human rights and the peoples non-violent movement.”[19]

 

Adding to all these, the UN High Commission on Refugees also denied the rights of West Papuan refugees in Papua New Guinea to be first of all acknowledged and secondly treated as refugees. More than 3,000 West Papuans are in PNG nowadays and all of them have never been granted rights to asylum nor treated as refugees. Even though, according to our customary laws, we are not refugees in our own Papuan soil, but based on the international laws, these people are refugees. The UNHCR has not yet stated its explanation as to why it violated the rights of Papuans to be treated as human beings. Some of them crossed the border because their lands were taken for transmigration settlements. Some escaped from murder threats, including the Secretary-General of Demmak.[20]

 

Thus, it is obvious that there are violations of the principles of the UNO and UN Bill of Rights as well as the UNGA resolution on Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. Indonesia as a State does not protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of Papuans as minorities within its respective territories and does not encourage conditions for the promotion of Papuan identity.[21] Can’t the UN and its organs do something about it?

 

2.4.2   Threat to Pluralism in West Papua: Tolerance and Stability (Social Environment)

Pluralism, i.e., tolerance, peace and security in interactions among different tribes of Papuans and between Papuans and non-Papuans is under a serious threat.  Indonesia now has a pluralistic dilemma; that is whether to maintain differences within one Indonesia or to continue exterminating differences and thereby creating a ‘oneness by force’. This dilemma concerns the very nature and future of Indonesia as a 21st century nation state.

 

In previous autonomy policies, the natives have been neglected and marginalized, more powers, access to public services and opportunities were given to non-Papuans. West Papua has been under special status, with special treatments; - meaning that an increased military presence; a shoot to kill policy of activists, arbitrary arrests and detentions have been normal. It means the kidnapping and murder of Papuan leaders and activists are legally justified. Policies in all aspects of life have neglected the existence and rights of indigenous Papuans as minorities in their own lands, and more importantly, the rights to live as human beings and to live freely.

 

This new special autonomy package, which Jakarta regards as a solution to previous problems, is in fact adding new problems to the existing ones. It is reversing the direction of previous autonomy packages. It gives more power to indigenous Papuans. Consequently, Papuans are beginning to close their eyes to this painful change. Others express their prolonged anger by pushing away the migrants and “planted people” in West Papua, including those mix-blooded Papuans. One striking example is that migrants have no representatives in the “Papua Parliament”. Thus, revengeful actions are unavoidable. Papuans want to replace many government officials at senior levels, even though they have lower ranks than their non-Papuans colleagues do.

 

Thus, guarantees for the indigenous peoples of West Papua to uphold and promote their cultural identities, their customary laws and claim their rights are now creating a new dilemma for “transmigrants” or “planted people”.  There has been a series of “reclaiming our lands” actions by the native Papuans who regard the previous handing over or taking away of their lands as illegal, done by force or without their consent. War against colonialism or imperialism in Indonesia now mixed up with religious, cultural and ethic issues.  This clearly complicates the problem. Thus, conflicts rooted into religious and ethic differences have more potential now than before.

 

At the same time, and in response to Papuans’ movements within this autonomy package, non-Papuans are now joining various militia-groups such as the Red-and-White Task Force, the Jihad Troops, and other organisations that claim their existence is to assist the national policy of fighting against native Papuans in maintaining West Papua within the Unitary Republic of Indonesia.  They see themselves as Indonesian Muslims fighting against Papuan separatists and Christians. These militia groups are standing behind the might of the Indonesian army and police forces, partly funded and trained by them, fighting against Papuans in defending Jakarta’s policy of Special Autonomy.

Another threat on pluralism in West Papua is the discriminative actions against different tribal groups in West Papua. Indonesian police order a shoot to kill policy against Benny Wenda, while other leaders are not forbidden to speak for our rights and allowed to communicate to the Indonesian authorities. Most leaders of the highlands of West Papua such as Mathias Wenda and Kelly Kwalik are hunted into the jungles while other leaders from the coastal areas of West Papua are not even arrested or questioned for their activities in defending our rights. The Koteka Tribal Assembly is outlawed but not other Tribal Councils in Indonesia and West Papua.

 

Thus, besides native and non-native divisions, the society of West Papua as a province is now divided into pro-integration and pro-independence groups as well as outlawed . Pro-integration are joining the militia groups and those pro-independence are supporting the movement of TPN/OPM. The groups and conflicts are clearly more complicated than before.

 

Thus, there are serious violations of the UN Declaration on Minorities, particularly discrimination against the minorities as stated in Articles 3 and 4.[22]

 

The Indonesian army and police forces are brutally cracking down on all Papuans suspected as being independence supporters. All this while those who join militia groups in the names of religion or national integrity are allowed to operate freely and under government protection. Even though Indonesia has declared a war against terrorism, it funds terrorism, just the same as Western governments that fight terrorism commit acts of terror by funding, equipping, and training the Indonesian military and police forces. Where should Papuans go to ask for help? To the UN that has Indonesia as its 50th member and to the Western Governments which are all members and founders of the United Nations, many of whom also fund terrorism and commit acts of terror?

 

These questions lead to a conclusion that there are discriminations against mass organisations, tribal groups and ethnic groups in Indonesia. So, can multiculturalism, multiethnic or pluralism or tolerance exist in such circumstances?

 

The Malay-Indonesians who are non-Christians in majority have marginalized Melanesoid Papuans and Christians in majority[23], in our own land.[24] Access to public services such as schools, economic sources, health services and job opportunities were and are limited to certain tribes and race and mostly non-Papuans get the benefits. Also, ancestral lands were taken away without consent from Papuan people, with argument that they should be released for “development” purposes. Issues of Islamisation, Javanisation/ Indonesianisation, and militarisation have become popular since Indonesia occupied the territory.

 

At the same time, massive and rapid exploration and exploitation operations of the nature and people have been underway. For examples, from seven mountains in the highlands, two of them have now become valleys due to mining operations. Hectares of forests are now cleared up. Protected species of plants and animals were hunted, mostly by the military for sale. Papuan staple foods have been replaced by Indonesian foods. Local languages have been systematically forbidden and replaced by Indonesian language. As many as 300 thousand Papuans have lost their lives, many are illiterate and live in isolated villages today.[25]

 

2.5 The Face of Law Enforcement in this ‘Special’ Autonomy

 

2.5.1 Politics defeats Law in this special autonomy

Law enforcement is extremely poor and often doesn’t even exist. Corrupt leaders remain active in power and appear untouchable by law. Criminals and terrorists groups and networks are permitted so long as the mission is for religious purposes and justified for defending the national integrity of Indonesia. Even though they punished Erico Gueteres, the pro Indonesian militia commander for East Timor, for ten years, they are recruiting more Gueteres in West Papua. Even though they claim to have banned militia groups in Indonesia, they are very active in funding and training them in West Papua.

 

Many arbitrary arrests and detentions against Papuan people are permitted. Benny Wenda and Theys Eluay’s cases clearly show how corrupt law enforcement in Indonesia really is. The police refused lawyers proposed by Demmak, but assigned a lawyer from the police to defend Benny Wenda’s case. How can a lawyer from the police stand for Benny Wenda and defend his case? The late Theys Eluay, with his four colleagues, as well as Rev. Obeth Komba with his six colleagues were also arrested and detained arbitrarily in late 2000 and released following the assassination of Theys Eluay.

 

Another outstanding case is the appointment of the current Police Commander for West Papua where Gen. Pol. Da’i Bachtiar appointed a new police commander without consulting the Governor of Papua, which, according to the Autonomy Bill, violates article 5 of the Bill, Chapter 48.[26] The police chief did break the law, but he is not punishable. He has the same level of impunity as the Chair of People’s Representatives, Akbar Tandjung, who clearly misused millions of money for welfare but still leads the house of parliament. The powerful king of Indonesian, Suharto is also untouched by any laws that ever existed in Indonesia. So are the killers of Theys Eluay, Simon Alom, William Onde and others.

 

West Papua is currently under martial law. The will of the military and police forces is above all else. What they do, for example, training and equipping militia groups, executing ambushes and assassinations, carrying out intimidation and acts terror, are all justified in the name of “Unity in Diversity” and national integrity. Should we allow national integrity to defeat democracy? Or How far can national integrity go, when it crosses the principles of democracy and human rights? Can the national integrity of a state end the lives of innocent people who freely and democratically express their wishes and aspirations?

 

2.5.2 The Autonomy Bill does not contain clear timeframe

In comparison to, for example, the autonomy package for Papuans in Bougainvillea, the package for Papuans in West Papua does not have a clear timeframe. If Indonesia argues that “special autonomy” is designed to develop the Papuan people, to make Papuans like Indonesians in various aspects of their lives, then it should clearly define the targets in terms of outcomes as well as timing. If Indonesia wants Papuans to become Indonesians by the forced acquisition of ancient lands and cultures, then it should provide limits, terms of references for time and finance and details of the government and corporate apparatus that they plan to use.

 

Papuans are in trauma. They know that Indonesia lied to the UN, the Netherlands, and the USA as well as to the Papuan people in the 1960s. In 1963, under the secret Memorandum of Rome of 30 September 1962[27], Indonesia was assigned to develop West Papua for 25 years, and after this term, Papuans would be given a chance to choose whether or not choose to remain with Indonesia. Instead of sticking to this memorandum, ten years later, Indonesia issued a decree, declaring West Papua to be a special autonomy and Military Operation Zone (DOM).

 

Should Papuans trust current policy? Is it true that the change of regime in Indonesia really spells a change of political culture and motives towards West Papua? In other words, “Is this special autonomy politically motivated or is it motivated by a goodwill to help Papuans as human beings?”

 

2.6 The Face of Governance in this ‘Special’ Autonomy

 

2.6.1 The Bill Does Produce Small Kings in Each Region instead of Big King in Jakarta

Two critical books on Special Autonomy by LAPERA and by myself [28] present important points. First of all, they claim that the package is not really a humanitarian package, but merely a political act in responding to the reformation and democratisation process, according to the demand of the outer-islanders[29] of Indonesia. For West Papua there is no doubt that it is a reaction to the demand for independence of West Papua.

 

The second claim is that the power of the bureaucrats in Jakarta is being given to bureaucrats in regions and this is creating small kings in each region. “Small kings” mean government officials who will use their powers and allow as many corporations as possible to exploit natural resources in West Papua, be it forests, be it gold, be it gas and oil. They will also suppress and oppress their people. The issue of decentralisation in Indonesia is not about distribution of power but authorisation of power to local authorities to carry out the programmes of the central government. Thus, inter-ethnic conflicts have more potential now than before.

 

2.6.2 Dilemma for Development Policies

“Development”, as the Indonesian officials calls it, is not the ‘development’ of what Papuans already have, but the destruction of what is already there and the construction of what is regarded “good” in the eyes of Jakarta. The cultural identity/ values/ indigenous beliefs and customary laws as well as tribal councils are denied and even outlawed. The Movement against environmental destruction is regarded as “primitive thinking”, “backward thinking” and “uncivilised opinion” and therefore rebellion against the formal laws, systems, values and government. Development for Indonesia is cutting down trees, construction of new buildings, roads, pollution, dams, and the further exploitation of natural resources by poisoning waters, plants and animals.

 

For Indonesia, repaying its debts to IMF through unsustainable development and destruction is the best way out for now. Thus, the environment is under serious threat. In other words, the bill facilitates uncontrollable policies that will rapidly threaten the natural environment. Local government is now allowed to make policies to generate income.

 

The main advocates of special autonomy packages for West Papua since 1963 have been that the packages are essential for progress or “development” of the uncivilised, cannibal, primitive, half-human tribes. Autonomy packages for West Papua have been NOT for “development” as we understand it, but in fact bloody projects to destroy West Papua and exterminate its inhabitants, to Indonesianise the territory, to exterminate the native inhabitants, and to take away all that belongs to the island. The Papuans experience this “development” as arbitrary arrests and detentions, rapes, murders, acts of terror and intimidation, and massive exploitation of the natural environment. big king in Jakarta has done a lot of these in the last four decades; now the appointed small-kings are beginning further chapters of the drama.

 

The uncivilised cannibals, primitive, and half-humans like myself are asking the following questions: What development? Whose development? Which development? Should we allow the rights of all beings to be violated in the name of “development”?

 

 

3    Conclusions & Proposals for Solutions

 

3.1 Concluding Remarks: The Real Problems in West Papua

Firstly, as mentioned before, this special autonomy is in fact, not a solution to the existing problems, but rather addition to the existing ones that complicates the problems. Gilbert[30] states: “… International law does accord a right of self-determination to peoples. On the other hand, States owe a much weaker obligation to persons belonging to minorities; they shall not be denied the right to enjoy their culture in community with other members of the group.”

 

Such is the theory, but I would like to state that in practice the “weaker obligation” of the state to minorities is now politicised or turned into the omitting the right to self-determination. This is achieved under the guise of promoting the right to development, pluralism, and others that UNWG on Minorities promotes/ advocates. Such a move underestimates or even violates the principles of democracy and human rights as stated in UN Charters, treaties, declarations and resolutions. 

 

A second root of the problems is as Samaddar[31] points out below:

Enormous confusion thus prevails. Is it a case of external linkages to internal conflicts, or a case of kin state as the problematic? Or, is the phenomenon of the assertion of the right to self-determination an instance of cross fire insurgency, where the issue of self-determination arises as a result of diplomacy that takes the form of low level support by the neighbouring states to insurgency-wars? Or, is it an unsolved problem relating to the minority groups in the process of nation building – a case of failure of autonomy arrangements?

 

The last question precisely relates to the root of the problem in West Papua. It is the “unsolved problem relating to the minority groups in the process of nation building” that brings about “a case of failure of autonomy arrangements” in West Papua. The most disputed referendum (the act of free choice) conducted by Indonesia was carried out on 4 July – 14 August 1969. [32]   Anthony L. Smith[33] puts the case rightly as follows:

Papua's merger with Indonesia has not always been a happy one. It is commonplace in Papua itself to argue that the Indonesian government has exercised colonialism over Papua in a more heavy-handed way than the previous Dutch imperial administration. Indonesia's founding president, Sukarno, made it a point of national pride that Papua rightfully belonged to the Republic of Indonesia, based on historical claims. This annexation was made formal by a 1969 plebiscite, in which approximately 1,000 carefully selected Papuan leaders unanimously opted for integration with Indonesia. The United Nations simply "noted" the plebiscite has having occurred, but it never actually endorsed its outcome.

 

Human Rights violations are the outcome of the unresolved problem, i.e., the Act of Free Choice. I totally agree with Anthony L. Smith[34]:

Despite the great gains that Indonesia's new devolution of power has delivered to the Papuans, human rights have barely improved since authoritarian times. The lesson that the Indonesian military appears unwilling to learn is that this ongoing violence helps reinforce an increasingly robust independence sentiment.

 

Therefore, promoting special autonomy with arguments to “develop” West Papua and therefore to protect and promote human rights is clearly politicising the special autonomy package for political benefits and not for humanity and human rights of the indigenous and minorities in West Papua. It is the cause of the problems. It complicates the problem. Therefore, to stop human rights violations is not by forcing Papuans to accept the special autonomy, but by resolving the “root” of the problems itself, i.e., the history of West Papua’s annexation (re-colonisation) by Indonesia in 1963-1969.

 

3.2 For the UNWG on Minorities

 

3.2.1 Comments in relation to this seminar

The first unfinished business for the UNWG on Minorities is that it should address issues on minorities that relate to colonialism, decolonisation and the history of specific territories and or peoples. Before campaigning for the rights to development and persuading minorities to live in tolerance within diverse cultural backgrounds, it should first advocate campaigns to re-examine the history of annexation / integration/ recolonisation of the people and territory through continuous and meaningful dialogue.  This should be mediated by the UNWG on Minorities or other specialised committees and experts. If not, the UNWG on Minorities will violate the same rights of minorities in its “campaigns” seek to assist.

 

The second unfinished business is the question of “What should come first: dialogue to resolve tensions and conflicts related to previous politics that violated human rights or to accept autonomy before solving the problems? In other words, should Papuans accept special autonomy package as a “compensation” for past mistakes, or should it be viewed as the obligation of the state to first resolve past mistakes. In comparison to South Africa’s apartheid, special autonomy for West Papua is not only to promote peace and justice, but more as a response to the demand for independence due to “unsolved” problems during the annexation of West Papua into Indonesia. It is not merely the issues of cultural rights and the right to development but it relates to civil and political rights. Should the UNWG on Minorities encourage minorities to accept whatever the states decide or should it provide the means of resolving unfinished business between states and minorities?

 

Thirdly, what type of autonomy is suitable for indigenous minorities? Indonesia has now offered personal / cultural autonomy, similar to autonomy for the Romas in Europe or Saami people within Scandinavian states. We need assistance from the UNWG on Minorities to help Indonesians and Papuans provide a suitable autonomy for indigenous minorities.

 

The last issue concerns the principle and agenda of the UNWG on Minorities: Does the UNWG on minorities regard autonomy as the final step in resolving indigenous minorities’ issues or as an initial step towards addressing further issues? Or, If not, what is next, after autonomy? I know that the UNWG on Minorities does not support what it calls external self-determination, but my question is, “Can it or should it ignore the fact that some indigenous minorities in Southeast Asia perceive autonomy packages (internal self-determination) as the beginning stages towards achieving full autonomy (external self-determination)?”[35] 

 

3.2.2 What Remains to be completed by Indonesia

There are a lot to be done in resolving the conflicts of interests between Papuans and Jakarta. But in summary, there are three ways forward, if Indonesia really wants to “develop” Papuans and West Papua: (1) re-examine the history of West Papua’s integration into Indonesia, (2) establish systems and procedures that facilitate / encourage expressions of opinions from the people and to quickly address those issues,[36] and (3) cancel the special autonomy package and re-zstart from the beginning by involving Papuan people in inputting and processing of the bill.

 

Besides, Indonesia has not done anything meaningful to resolve political conflict in West Papua. The Chairperson of the Sub-Commission of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights stated:

The Sub-Commission remains concerned, however, at the persistent reports of human rights violations, including extra judicial killings and ill-treatment, as well as continued serious violence and abuses, for example in Aceh and Ambon. The Government has taken various actions to deal with some of these concerns, for example by promoting dialogue and reconciliation in various regions, including Irian Jaya; releasing a substantial number of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience from different parts of the country; and bringing to justice or dismissing some police officers and soldiers. In its statement to the Sub-Commission the Government also committed itself to continuing to bring to justice those who violate human rights, humanitarian law and criminal law so as to combat impunity.[37]

 

However, as far as I know, there has been no single dialogue held between Papuans and Indonesian authorities so far. Impunity for Indonesian authorities is still the main problem now.

 

3.3 Recommendations

3.3.1    The first objective of this seminar is to identify priorities on minority issues in Southeast Asia for the future activities of the OHCHR. The area of minority issues in Indonesia is the arrogance and / or intolerance as well as the discriminative policies of the government in imposing its autonomy policies. Particularly, in the West Papuan case, there is surely an urgent need for international mediation to bring Papuans and Jakarta into a meaningful dialogue as the most civilised, respectful, and democratic way to resolve or minimise the conflicting interests and agenda. 

There is an urgent need for the UN and its organs, including UNICEF, UNDP, UN Special Rapporteurs on Indigenous Peoples, UN Special Rapporteurs on Forced Disappearance, and other organs dealing with democratisation and conflict resolutions to help Indonesian and Papuan people to resolve this past unsolved problem of West Papua’s integration into Indonesia.

3.3.2     We call on the participating organisations and persons in this seminar to facilitate West Papuan representatives in our lobbies to the UN organs in order to invite Special Rapporteurs on Forced Disappearances and Indigenous Peoples to visit West Papua and to openly hold dialogues with Papuan representatives and the Indonesian authorities to identify lingering problems that block all ways towards peaceful resolutions of the problems in West Papua.

3.3.3    We call on the International NGOs, either those who are present here or potential bodies that you know, to help us.

The Henry Dunant Centre in Geneva is helping Aceh in resolving the problems there. The UN and other NGOs are helping Moluccas. West Papua now needs your helping hand, to bring some sort towards ending our suffering.

3.3.4    We call on the mass organisations and NGOs of South East Asia and the Pacific to come together in exposing our problems and working towards solving these problems by sharing skills, knowledge and experience.



[1] Comprehensive deliberations of the problems are presented in my book entitled: PAPUA MENGGUGAT II: 22 October 2001, 22:30, Politik Otonomisasi NKRI di Papua Barat, WatchPapua Publishing, Yogyakarta: 2002, 395pp. This paper only presents the summary of one of 17 chapters.

[2] Sentani Tribal Elder, Chair of Papua Presidium Council, Chair of Papua Customary Council, Kidnapped 10 November 2001, and Found dead on 11 November 2001.

[3] Supervisor of the Koteka Tribal Assembly (Demmak), Member of Papua Panel, Papua euroPress Desk Officer, Spokesperson for International Community of Demmak, WestPaC and Alliance of Papuan Students. Websites:

http://www.westpapua.org.uk/demmak/ & http://www.westpapua.net. Emails: koteka@westpapua.net (to contact the writer), demmak@westpapua.net (to contact Demmak)

[4] Papuans do not really regard themselves as minorities, but as marginalized-indigenous. The fact is that we are minorities both ethnically and religiously as well as ideology.

[5] John Saltford presents further deliberations of the scandal in his paper, summarised from his Doctoral Thesis entitled: UNITED NATIONS INVOLVEMENT WITH THE ACT OF SELF? DETERMINATION IN WEST IRIAN (INDONESIAN WEST NEW GUINEA) 1968 TO 1969), 1999, http://www.westpapua.net/docs/books/book0/unwp.doc. Also Read Summary of UN FIASCO by AMP International: UN Scandals in West Papua History: Legal Action Against the United Nations, the United States, the Netherlands and Indonesia in Connection with West Papua's integration into NKRI is Legally Justifiable, http://www.westpapua.net/cases/legal/unscan.rtf

[6] The complete document can be downloaded from http://www.westpapua.net/docs/nya.htm

[7] The term “IRIAN” stands for Ikut, Republik, Indonesia, Anti Netherlands (meaning, follow the republic of Indonesia, and anti the Netherlands) and “JAYA” means GLORIOUS, a name that was made up by Sukarno, disregarding and disrespecting the real name of the nation. They were not IRIANS nor IRIANESE, but Papuans. This change of name clearly violated human rights, an act of wiping out the identity of a nation, an assassination of a nation’s identity. Violation of Article 1 point (1) of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (henceforth the UN Declaration on Minorities) the UNGA resolution 47/135 of 18 December 1992.

[8] Declaration of the UN on Democracy, Adopted by Inter-Parliamentary Group Council, on its 161st session, (in Cairo, 16 September 1997) in DEMOCRACY: Its principles and achievement, Inter Parliamentary Union, Geneva: 1998.

[9] The UN Declaration on Minorities., Ibid.

[10] Besides The Koteka Tribal Assembly (Demmak),  there are Mamta (Mamberamo-Tami Tribal Council), and other councils of tribes in West Papua, established by and belong to the tribal groups ourselves. Thus, violating Article 2 point (4) of the UN Declaration on Minorities: “Persons belonging to minorities have the right to establish and maintain their own associations.”

[11] Ibid.

[12] It violates Article 2 of the UN Declaration on Minorities, Ibid.

[13] During the Act of Free Choice in 1969, Indonesia banned the New Guinea Council which was officially and democratically established on 1 December 1961 and established its own pro-Indonesian Consultative Council for Act of Free Choice (DMP)[13], where all members of the DMP as agents of Indonesia and consequently these carefully selected people voted in favour of Indonesia.

[14] PDP stands for Presidium Dewan Papua or Papua Presidium Council. Wheres LMA stands for the Lembaga Masyarakat Adat Papua or the Papua Customary Council.

[15] See Decky Murib: "Captain Markus invited me", Interview between the Deputy Chief Police of Papua with Decky Murib, the key eye witness who accompanied the army in the ambush at http://www.westpapua.net/cases/hr/deckymurib.htm

[16] More in the Militia groups is here: http://www.westpapua.net/about/smp/

[17] More stories on human rights violations are here: http://www.westpapua.net/cases/hr/

[18] Demmak stands for Dewan Musyawarah Masyarakat Koteka or the Koteka Tribal Assembly for Rights, Peace and Justice in West Papua. And AMP is abbreviation of Aliansi Mahasiswa Papua – The Alliance of Papuan Students.

[19] PAPUA MENGGUGAT: 11 November 2001, Hari Kematian HAM, Demokrasi dan Perjuangan Damai di Tanah Papua?, Galang Printika, Yogyakarta:2002, 495pp. (PAPUA APPEALS: 11 November 2001, The Funeral Day of Human Rights, Democracy and non-Violent Movement in Papua Soil.)

[20] According to Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, 28 July 1951, Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, New York, 31 January 1967: “The Convention provides the definition of a refugee. A refugee is a person who is outside one's country of origin (or habitual residence in the case of stateless persons) and who, owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is unable or unwilling to avail oneself of the protection to which one is entitled.”

[21] UN Declaration on Minorities, Ibid..

[22] The condition in West Papua also clearly violates principles of the INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS oF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION.

[23] Papuans are minorities both ethnically and in religion in West Papua as well as indigenous peoples.

[24] This is the real feeling of Papuans that in fact potential for threat to pluralism in West Papua.

[25] Reports on human rights violations can be seen at http://www.westpapua.net/cases/hr/

[26] Autonomy Bill for West Papua: http://www.westpapua.net/cases/autonm/uuotsus.htm

[27] Read the memorandum at http://www.westpapua.net/docs/nya.htm

[28] Otonomy Pemberian Negara, by TIM LAPERA, Jakarta:2002, and PAPUA MENGGUGAT II: 21 October 2001, 22:30 WIB, Politik Otomisasi NKRI di Papua Barat, by S. Karoba, WatchPapua: Yogyakarta, 2002. Summary in Indonesian version is available at: http://www.westpapua.net/docs/papers/paper3/

[29] Javanese are politically normally referred to as pure Indonesians, and others are called outer-islanders, non-Indonesian nationals who live within Indonesian state.

[30] AUTONOMY AND MINORITY GROUPS - A LEGAL RIGHT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW? (Paper prepared by Geoff Gilbert, Professor of Law), COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and   Protection of Human Rights, Working Group on Minorities, Seventh session, 14 to 18 May 2001.

[31] AUTONOMY, SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF MINIMAL JUSTICE IN SOUTH ASIA, Paper prepared by Ranabir Samaddar, Director, Peace Studies Programme, South Asia Forum for Human Rights), COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Working Group on Minorities, Seventh session), 14 to 18 May 2001.

[32] Papers on the Scandals during the Act of Free Choice are presented at http://www.westpapua.net/docs/books/ & http://www.westpapua.net/cases/legal/

[33] Violence in Papua: The Role of Military Elements in Perpetuating Violence, By Anthony L. Smith, http://www.westpapua.net/cases/hr/hr2002.htm

[34] Violence in Papua: The Role of Military Elements in Perpetuating Violence, By Anthony L. Smith, http://www.westpapua.net/cases/hr/hr2002.htm

[35] This different perspective on autonomy first appeared in a recent interview with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) spokesperson, Tgk. Sofyan Dawod and Indonesian regional commander to Aceh. GAM regards autonomy package, as the first step towards further steps until Aceh is fully independent whereas Indonesia claims the peace accord to be signed on 9 December 2002 is the final solution to problems in Aceh. This relates to what Samaddar presents in a paper as mentioned before, which is the reality of indigenous minority’ issues in Southeast Asia.

[36] There is no representation of minorities in national or State parliaments and in election procedures. There should be special procedural rights, in particular, veto right on minority issues. Basic requirement: freedom of association does not exist, most of the tribal councils are outlawed, with no clear which legal basis. Systems are not privileging minorities‘ representation in parliament: integration of minorities in the political party system. There is no direct or indirect privilege for minorities‘ representation as well as legal and political status of tribal councils, such as Demmak and other mass organisations under Indonesian laws. There are no parliamentary committees for minority issues or ministerial responsibilities for minority issues. Papuans are not regarded as minorities, no government commissioner for minorities, and no specialised governmental bodies for minorities. Since January 2002, the Minority parliament (MPR) has not yet been set up. There are no bodies appointed by parliament for examining complaints or conducting inquiries. Arrangements on the representation of minorities on regional or municipal level are not clear, no minority members as civil servants What Papuans want are Informal channels of participation: Round tables, advisory councils and liaison committees.  All these affect the absence of opportunities for participation through the devolution of powers to the local or regional level and to autonomous entities.

[37] Statement by the Chairperson of the Sub-Commission, made on 24 August 1999, Situation of human rights in Indonesia, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS.

   
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