Who’s Driving Islamic Militant Groups?

May 24, 2002 05:42 PM, Editor

Laksamana.Net - Two Americans are in two minds about terrorism in Indonesia. 

Paul Fujimura, US State Department expert on counter-terrorism, said Thursday (23/5/02) there was evidence that al-Qaeda had already established itself in sanctuaries in Indonesia. 

Meanwhile Indonesian observer Dr Jeffrey Winters says the problem in dealing with terrorism in Indonesia is that the lion’s share of terror in this country occurs at the hands of the military. 

And rather than fighting supposed al-Qaeda cells and violent extremists, elements of the military, either active or retired, play cynically with “terrorists” in the pursuit of various domestic political agendas (Laksamana.Net, Tuesday 21/5/02). 

Fujimura did not elaborate which Islamic group he might have been referring to or what kind of political outlook influenced terrorist organizations allegedly connected to al-Qaeda. This makes it impossible to disclose whether the alleged organizations have close links to military hardliners or are purely acting in the name of Islam. 

As far as terrorism in Indonesia is concerned, there are at least two events in history which give a clear picture of how involved the military and intelligence elements have been in masterminding terrorism in Indonesia. 

Two prominent military figures stand out as the principal actors in state-sponsored terrorism in Indonesia: Colonel Zulkifli Lubis in the 1960s and General Ali Murtopo in the 1970s. 

A convenient starting point is the attempt to assassinate founding President Sukarno in 1956, an incident popularly known as the Cikini affair. 

On November 30, 1956, as Sukarno was visiting his children’s school in Cikini, hand grenades were thrown in an attempt to assassinate him. Though Sukarno was unharmed, 11 people were killed and at least 30 seriously injured, mostly children. 

The chief suspect behind the assassination attempt was Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, a former Army intelligence chief and deputy chief of staff who had been among the contenders for the position of chief of staff in 1955, when General Abdul Haris Nasution was appointed to the post. 

Lubis was strongly connected to Islamic militant groups, and he established an underground organization led by men from the strongly Islamic Dompo area of the eastern Indonesia island of Sumbawa. 

While the group had no connection with the Islamic-based Masyumi Youth Organization (Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia – GPII), it drew a number of its members from the organization. Others had ties to the West Java Darul Islam movement led by nationalist freedom fighter Marijan Kartosuwiryo. 

According to Audrey and George Kahin in their book Subversion as Foreign Policy, Lubis’ organization ran parallel to his efforts to build a Jakarta-based anti-communist paramilitary group known as Gerakan Anti-Kommunis (GAK). 

This group was against both Sukarno and Nasution. A key aide of Lubis, Saleh Ibrahim, who headed the GAK and was a member of Masyumi, escaped after the assassination attempt but three youths involved were tried and executed. When asked why they attacked Sukarno, the four youths had answered: “Allah told us to do so.” 

Lubis was widely believed to be the puppet master behind the Cikini Affair. He was forced to go underground, soon emerging in West Sumatra. 

His presence there is often linked to the West Sumatra rebellion, the PRRI, which broke out in 1958. Also involved was economist Sumitro Djoyohadikusumo, who had fled to West Sumatra to avoid a police investigation concerning his alleged involvement in corrupt practices. 

Ali Murtopo’s role as a practitioner of state-sponsored terrorism is a different story. As personal assistant to President Suharto and deputy head of intelligence directly responsible to Suharto, Murtopo was assigned to curtail and cripple the political opposition that represented a threat to Suharto’s regime and his political base, Golkar. 

In the run up to the 1977 general election, Suharto was disturbed by an assessment made by the National Defense and Security Council (Dewan Pertahanan dan Keamanan Nasional). 

According to the council’s finding in 1975, if the electoral contest was completely fair, Golkar would only get 45%. To Suharto and his key presidential assistant, this meant that the Islamic-based party United Development Party (PPP) would be the real threat. 

An intelligence operation to influence the outcome of the 1977 general election was brought into action. What followed led many to believe that Suharto and Golkar had decided to create a “special situation.” 

The emergence of Komando Jihad (Holy War Commando) just weeks before the 1977 election campaign gave rise to suspicions that it was the creation of Murtopo and the intelligence community, aimed at discrediting PPP politicians. 

Leaders of Komando Jihad such as Ateng Jailani, Danu Subroto, Abu Darda (a son of Kartosuwiryo, the original Darul Islam leader), Ismail Pranoto, and Zainal Abidin, were former prominent figures in Darul Islam, an organization known to have fallen under the control of Ali Murtopo. 

Other versions say that despite the Komando Jihad links to Murtopo, they abused his trust. This argument is presented by, among others, Hari Tjan Silalahi, a prominent actor in the Center for Strategic and International Studies, also a creation of Murtopo. 

Whatever the truth, it was clear enough that terrorism in Indonesia was not wholly driven by ideology, nor did it have mainstream support from the Muslim community. 

Instead, terrorist acts have most often been driven by internal military tensions or by government bids to cripple opposition. 


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